University of Baltimore Law Forum, Volume 48, Number 2 (Spring 2018) by unknown
University of Baltimore Law Forum 
Volume 48 Number 2 Article 1 
3-1-2018 
University of Baltimore Law Forum, Volume 48, Number 2 (Spring 
2018) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(2018) "University of Baltimore Law Forum, Volume 48, Number 2 (Spring 2018)," University of Baltimore 
Law Forum: Vol. 48 : No. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol48/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu. 
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW FORUM
VOLUME 48 SPRING 2018 NUMBER 2
ARTICLE
Realizing "Meaningful" in Maryland: A Call for
Reforming Maryland's Parole System in Light of
Graham, Miller, & Montgomery
Lila Meadows, Esq. 59
COMMENT
Baltimore City Schools Need Many Things- A
Personal Police Force is Not One of Them
Kelli L. Cover 69
Navigating the Gap in Access to Civil
Justice: An Alternative to a Civil Gideon
Gregory R. Eyler 93
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services

























REALIZING "MEANINGFUL" IN MARYLAND: A CALL FOR
REFORMING MARYLAND'S PAROLE SYSTEM IN LIGHT
OF GRAHAM, MILLER, & MONTGOMERY
By: Lila Meadows'
Since 1995, various governors in Maryland have adopted a "life means
life" policy and have refused to exercise their discretion to grant parole to
individuals serving life sentences, including those sentenced to life as
juveniles. The result is that many juvenile lifers who can demonstrate
rehabilitation, express remorse, and have won the support of the Maryland
Parole Commission languish in prison without any realistic opportunity for
release. While technically eligible for parole, juvenile offenders serving life
sentences in Maryland are more likely to die in prison than to gain release
through parole or commutation.
This article explores Maryland's obligation to provide a meaningful
opportunity for release for juvenile offenders serving life sentences in light
of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Graham v. Florida,
Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana. While reform efforts have
traditionally focused on the governor's role in the parole process, broader
reforms to Maryland's parole system are necessary to ensure that juveniles
sentenced to life in prison have a realistic chance to rejoin society if they can
demonstrate rehabilitation. Without a standard that binds the Maryland
Parole Commission and the Governor to consider the characteristics
attendant to youth and to give due weight to those characteristics, Maryland's
parole system cannot comply with the Supreme Court's mandate in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery.
I. MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR RELEASE
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles
to life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses violated
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.2 The Court
held that because juveniles are less culpable than their adult counterparts and
also have a greater capacity for change and rehabilitation, states must provide
juveniles with a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
Lila N. Meadows, Esq. is a clinical teaching fellow in the Juvenile Justice Project at
the University of Baltimore School of Law. Thank you to Professor Jane Murphy
who co-authored the amicus brief that formed the basis of this article and to
Professor Cheri Levin for her feedback on the amicus brief
2 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," categorically barring both
mandatory and discretionary life without parole sentences for non-homicide
juvenile offenders. Two years later the Court addressed juvenile homicide
offenders in Miller v. Alabama, striking down mandatory life without the
possibility of parole sentences but maintaining a state's ability to impose a
discretionary life without parole sentence only in rare the case of a juvenile
who the court determines is "incorrigible" or "irreparably corrupt."4', Under
Miller, juvenile offenders must receive individualized sentencing where
youth and its attendant characteristics are taken into account before imposing
a sentence.6 Montgomery v. Louisiana applied Miller retroactively in 2016,
clarifying that its decision in Miller was both procedural and substantive in
nature, opening the door for juvenile offenders already serving life without
the possibility of parole to challenge the basis for their sentences.'
While the Supreme Court made clear in Graham and Miller that juvenile
offenders must have a meaningful opportunity for release, the Court declined
to enumerate how states might fulfill that requirement, stating only that
parole might be one way to satisfy its obligation. The Court notes in
Montgomery:
"A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole,
rather than by resentencing them. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders
eligible for parole after 25 years). Allowing those
offenders to be considered for parole ensures that
juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient
immaturity-and who have since matured-will not be
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of
the Eighth Amendment."8
The opportunity for release will be afforded to those
who demonstrate the truth of Miller's central intuition-
that children who commit even heinous crimes are
capable of change.
Historically, state parole boards have acted with broad discretion as to
how decisions related to release are made.9 In the past, the Supreme Court
3 Id. at 75.
4 Id. at 479-80, quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
'Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
6 Id.
7 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
8 Id. at 736.
9 Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (per curiam) ("There is no right
under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence") (citations omitted).
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has deferred to the state's discretion in release decisions, noting that parole
boards are free to consider a number of elements, but also to rely on "their
experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability
of parole release."10 Graham, Miller and Montgomery shifted the legal
landscape with respect to juvenile offenders and imposed constitution
burdens on the state to ensure that juveniles are afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate change.
As the Supreme Court noted in Montgomery, the mandate in Miller has
both a procedural and substantive requirement." The procedural component
requires a sentencing judge or parole commission "to consider a juvenile
offender's youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life
without parole is a proportionate sentence."12 A parole hearing "does not
replace but rather gives effect to Miller's substantive holding that life
without parole is an excessive sentence" except for the rare juvenile offender
for who "rehabilitation is impossible."3 Because of this substantive holding,
simply making a juvenile eligible for parole under an existing state parole
system does not comply with the Eighth Amendment. While the state may
remedy a Graham or Miller sentencing violation by offering a juvenile
serving a life sentence the opportunity for parole, every parole system does
not automatically constitute a meaningful opportunity for release as required
by Graham and Miller. Instead, if a state chooses to meet its obligation
under Graham and Miller through parole, there must be a standard for
release that allows a juvenile offender to predict their likelihood of release
based on their demonstrated rehabilitation.
Maryland has less than 20 juvenile offenders who are serving life without
the possibility of parole sentences. Yet, because governors have routinely
refused parole to any lifer since 1995, including those sentenced as juveniles,
the more than 300 juveniles who are serving parole-eligible life sentences in
Maryland have little hope for release. The executive's blanket policy to deny
parole without regard for individual circumstances or evidence of
rehabilitation denies juvenile lifers individualized consideration and has
converted those sentences to defacto life without parole sentences. Because
Maryland operates a highly politicized system that articulates no standard for
release, it fails to guarantee the meaningful opportunity for release required
under Graham and Miller.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE PAROLE OF
LIFERS IN MARYLAND
'0 Greenholtz v. Inamtes of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
"Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734-35 (2016).
12 Id. at 734.
' Id. at 735.
2018]1 61
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Parole is an executive function carried out by the Maryland Parole
Commission, whose mission is, "determining on a case-by-case basis whether
inmates serving sentences of six months or more in state or local facilities are
suitable for release into the community under certain conditions or
supervision by the Division of Parole and Probation."1 4 In order for those
serving a life sentence to be paroled, individuals must also secure the
approval of the governor.'5 Maryland is one of only three states that imposes
this additional requirement for release.'6 Historically, and despite requiring
action from the executive, lifers who could demonstrate a record of good
conduct in prison were routinely paroled after serving a significant amount of
time on their sentence.'7
Attitudes towards parole of violent offenders began to change in the late
1980s as the "tough on crime" and "truth in sentencing" movements took
hold. Maryland ended its practice of allowing lifers to participate in work
release in 1993 after Rodney Stokes murdered his girlfriend while
participating in Maryland's work release program. On September 21, 1995,
responding to the Stokes incident and seeking a "tough on crime" reputation,
Governor Parris Glendenning declared a "life means life" policy, essentially
ending parole for individuals serving life sentences. In his announcement,
the Governor instructed the Maryland Parole Commission "not to even
recommend-to not even send to [his] desk-a request for parole for murderers
and rapists."18 The Maryland Parole Commission heeded Glendenning's
instructions and ceased holding parole hearings for individuals serving life
sentences.19
In 1999, Governor Glendenning's policy was scrutinized in Lomax v.
Warden.20 Lomax challenged the Maryland Parole Commission's refusal to
hold parole hearings for lifers and the Governor's refusal to grant parole as a
blanket policy.2 ' The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
Glendenning's statement in 1995 "was simply an announcement of
14 Maryland Parole Commission Agency Mission Statement, Dep't of Pub. Safety
and Correctional Services, https://www.dpscs.state.mdtus/agencies/mpc.shtnl_(Iast
visited Mar. 1, 2018).
1s MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. §4-305(b)(3) (West 2013).
16 WALTER LOMAX & SONIA KUMAR, STILL BLOCKING THE ExIT, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND (2015),
https://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/publications/afr-stillblockingexit215.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
'7 Between 1969 and 1994, 181 lifers were paroled by Governors Mandel, Hughes,
and Schaefer. See Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative v. Governor Hogan et al,
2016 EL 1403172 (D.Md.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, D.
Maryland, No. 1:16-cv-01021-ELH, April 6, 2016.
18 Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569, 573 (1999).
19 Id.
20 Lomax, 356 Md. 569 (1999).
21 id.
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guidelines as to how the Governor would exercise the discretion which he
has under the law." 22 The court went on to explain that the Governor was
free to adopt a different policy stance at any point, but that such policies
informing how discretion is exercised do not constitute laws.23 Critically, the
court noted that the Maryland General Assembly had not set forth any factors
that the Governor must consider when exercising discretion to grant or deny
parole.24 While the court upheld the Governor's right to exercise unfettered
discretion, it found that the Maryland Parole Commission was required to
fulfill its statutory obligation by continuing to hold parole hearings for
individuals serving life sentences and making recommendations to the
Governor in suitable cases.2 5
After Lomax, the Maryland Parole Commission resumed holding parole
hearings for lifers and in some cases, making recommendations for parole to
the governor, but the Governor routinely denied those recommendations and
in some cases left recommendations unanswered. The Maryland Legislature
responded in 2011 by amending the statute to require the Governor to take
action on a parole recommendation within 180 days.26 If the Governor fails
to act within that time, the parole commission's recommendation becomes
final.27 In response, Governor O'Malley began denying all recommendations
for parole within the 180 day window, causing the Maryland Parole
Commission to cease recommending lifers for parole, and instead begin
sending them to the governor as requests for a commutation.2 8 Because no
time bar applies to a commutation request, cases once again languished on
the governor's desk without action.29
III. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES IN
MARYLAND'S PAROLE SYSTEM
While critics of Maryland's parole system have typically focused on the
governor's role in the process, the deficiencies that render the system
unconstitutional in light of Graham and Miller begin long before a case
reaches that final layer of review. Data from the Maryland Parole
Commission suggests that relatively few lifers ever make it to the stage of
the parole process where the Maryland Parole Commission makes a
recommendation for release to the Governor. According to the most recent
data available, between 2004 and July 2017, the Maryland Parole
22 Id. at 481.
23 Id. at 481 (citing Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 672 (1987)).
24 Id. at 581.
25 Id. at 580.
26 MD. CODE ANN., CoRR. SERVS. §7-301(5)(iii) (West 2013).
27 Id
28 S. 249, 438th Cong. (2018) (revised fiscal and policy note).
29 See Lomax and Kumar, supra note 17, at 8.
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Commission recommended 14 lifers for parole out of a population of over
2,100 individuals serving life sentences.30 Only two of those individuals
were approved for release, both by the Hogan administration. In that same
period, the Commission recommended 100 individuals for sentence
commutations, but various governors granted only 12 recommendations.32
Taken together, only 114 individuals received a recommendation for parole
or commutation over a thirteen-year period, constituting roughly .54 percent
of the lifer population. Of the few individuals recommended, only 14
individuals, or 12.2 percent, were eventually released through the parole
process.
While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that some juvenile
offenders may indeed spend the remainder of their lives in prison despite
being eligible for parole, the Court made it clear that it would be a rare
circumstance and occur only in the instance that a juvenile offender could not
demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation.34 In Maryland the inverse is true. It
is only the rare individual serving a life sentence who the Maryland Parole
Commission recommends for parole. It is even rarer that the Commission's
recommendation results in release. While the Court's decisions in Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery do not set quotas for release, a system that so rarely
paroles lifers cannot comply with the Court's substantive holdings in those
cases without a finding that lifers in Maryland are incorrigible and do not
warrant release.
In addition to the significant substantive deficiencies reflected in parole
release outcomes, parole hearings in Maryland lack any of the due process
protections that would render them a meaningful opportunity for release.
Procedurally, parole hearings for juvenile lifers and adult offenders in
Maryland are identical. Although there is no statutory right to counsel for
parole hearings in Maryland, an individual may retain an attorney to help
prepare for parole, but the MPC severely restricts the role of attorneys in
parole proceedings.3 5 Attorneys cannot attend their client's parole hearing
unless a victim representative requests that the hearing be open, and even in
those cases, cannot make statements on their client's behalf or challenge
factual assertions made by parole commissioners that may be incorrect. 36
30 Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative's
Interrogatories, Interrogatory No.3 - No.5, dated July 7, 2017 in Maryland




34 Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 726 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573).
35 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(2)(i) (West 2012); COMAR §
12.08.01.08(A) (2017); COMAR § 12.08.01.18(C)(1) (2016).
36 Id.
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In October 2016, the Maryland Parole Commission amended the
regulations related to factors it considers during parole hearings for juveniles
serving life sentences to include the following factors:
(a) Age at the time the crime was committed;
(b) The individual's level of maturity and sense of responsibility at the time
the crime was committed;
(c) Whether influence or pressure from other individuals contributed to the
commission of the crime;
(d) Whether the prisoner's character developed since the time of the crime in
a manner that indicates the prisoner will comply with the conditions of
release;
(e) The home environment and family relationships at the time the crime was
committed;
(f) The individual's educational background and achievement at the time the
crime was committed; and
(g) Other factors or circumstances unique to prisoners who committed crimes
at the time the individual was a juvenile that the Commissioner determines to
be relevant.37
While those factors loosely track the language in Miller, the regulation
offers no guidance as to how parole commissioners must weigh those factors
in light of other considerations such as the underlying nature of the crime,
and fails to instruct that commissioners view youth-related factors as
mitigating.8 Juvenile lifers are at an increased disadvantage in Maryland as
there is no right to judicial review of the Maryland Parole Commission's or
Governor's decision other than a writ of mandamus. The Maryland Parole
Commission's failure to create a record or transcript of parole hearings for
individuals serving a life sentence renders a writ of mandamus a non-viable
avenue for relief for juveniles who feel that the commission or governor did
not give their juvenile status due consideration.39
Other states have recognized the importance of due process protections
for juvenile lifers in light of Graham and Miller. In Diatchenko v. Dist.
Attorney for Suffolk District, the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of counsel in ensuring that juveniles receive a meaningful
opportunity for release in the context of a parole hearing:
"In the case of a juvenile homicide offender-at least at the
initial parole hearing-the task is probably far more complex
than in the case of an adult offender because of "the unique
characteristics" of juvenile offenders. A potentially massive
amount of information bears on these issues, including legal,
medical, disciplinary, educational, and work-related
37 COMAR 12.08.01.18
3 8 d.
3 COMAR § 12.08.01.18(C)(2); CoMAR 12.08.01.19(A)(3).
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evidence ... An unrepresented, indigent juvenile homicide
offender will likely lack the skills and resources to gather,
analyze, and present this evidence adequately."40
Like Maryland, California is one of the three states that require the
governor's approval for release on parole. Yet, California allows juvenile
offenders a meaningful right to counsel and grants a right of judicial review
if the governor overturns the parole board's recommendation for parole.41 In
2013, the California legislature enacted the "Youthful Offender Act" that
required the parole board to "give great weight to the diminished culpability
of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with
relevant case law." 4 2 Unlike Maryland's regulation, the California statute
directs the parole board to weigh youth-related factors more heavily than
other considerations.
IV. RECENT EFFORTS TO CHALLENGE AND REFORM
MARYLAND'S PAROLE SYSTEM
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM EFFORTS
Legislative efforts to reform Maryland's parole system have focused
squarely on the governor's role in the process. Beginning in 2009, advocates
have introduced legislation in the Maryland General Assembly every year to
remove the Governor from the parole process. Each year the bills have
focused on striking the language of MD Code, Correctional Service §7-
301(5)(iii) that gives the governor authority to approve or deny parole
decisions with respect to lifers.43 In 2017, House Bill 732 passed in the
House of Delegates, but the cross filed version in the Senate failed to make it
out of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee." In the 2018 legislative
session, the bill once again stalled in the Senate committee.4 5  While
recognizing the problems with an overly politicized parole process,
legislators are hesitant to remove a layer of review for lifers seeking release.
With the election of a Republican governor, the issue has also taken on a
partisan angle, with Republicans hesitant to support legislation that would
40 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk District, 27 N.E. 3d 349, 360 (Mass.
2015).
41 Cal. Penal Code § 3051, 4801 (West 2013).
42 Id.
43 Monique Dixon, Tracy Velazquez, et al. Parole Reform in Maryland, 44-DEC Md.
B.J. 50, 57 (2011).
44 H.D. 723, 2017 Leg., 437' Sess. (Md. 2017), S. 694, 2017 Leg., 437" Sess. (Md.
2017).
45 S. 249, 2018 Leg., 4 38th Sess. (Md. 2018).
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strip Governor Hogan of authority and that the Governor has publicly
opposed.46 To date, the Maryland General Assembly has not considered any
legislation that would reform Maryland's parole process given the Court's
holdings in Graham, Miller and Montgomery.
B. JUDICIAL CHALLENGES
In 2016, the Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative and the American
Civil Liberties Union of Maryland brought suit in the Federal District Court
of Maryland against the state, arguing that "life means life" violates the 8 th
Amendment rights of juvenile lifers in Maryland under Graham and Miller.4 7
The suit is currently in settlement negotiations.
In February 2018, the Maryland Court of Appeals heard the cases of two
juvenile lifers, Daniel Carter and James Bowie, who challenged the legality
of their sentences of life with the possibility of parole given the executive
branch's failure to grant parole to any juvenile lifer since 1995. Both Carter
and Bowie challenged the Governor's unfettered discretion under Lomax to
grant or deny parole for any reason at all absent statutory standards. Less
than a week after oral arguments in Bowie and Carter, Governor Hogan
issued an executive order announcing that he will make parole decisions in
accordance with the same standards that bind the Maryland Parole
Commission, and in cases where he disapproves parole, he will issue a
written decision to the Maryland Parole Commission. While the executive
order is a step forward in constraining the Governor's discretion, Governor
Hogan or subsequent governors can rescind the order at any time. Further,
the order does not address the central deficiency in Maryland's parole
system: the fact that parole authorities are not required to give great weight
to the mitigating attributes of youth. In light of the Supreme Court's
mandate in Graham and Miller, the Court of Appeals should accept the
invitation to revisit its decision in Lomax in so far as juveniles are concerned
by recognizing that the state must adopt some cognizable standard for
release.
CONCLUSION
46 See Wiggins, 0. and Marimow, A. (2018). Hogan Issues Executive Order on
Juvenile Offenders Serving Life Sentences, The Washington Post. [online] Available
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/hogan-issues-executive-order-
on-juvenile-offenders-serving-life-sentences/2018/02/09/fa931956-Odd3-11 e8-95a5-
c396801049ef story.html?utm term=-.ae45f80bae7d [Accessed 21 May 2018],
quoting Governor Hogan's chief legal counsel Robert Scholz that there is no
"reasonable justification for removing gubernatorial oversight."
4 Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative v. Governor Hogan et al, 2016 EL 1403172
(D.Md.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, D. Maryland, No. 1: 16-cv-
01021-ELH, April 6, 2016.
48 Executive Order 01.01.2018.06, issued 9 February 2018.
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Recognizing that Graham, Miller, and Montgomery have added a
constitutional dimension to parole for juvenile lifers, many states have
reformed their parole systems to incorporate due process protections and
articulate a standard for review that recognizes the significance that youth-
related factors must play in parole decision. While Maryland has adopted
regulations that roughly correspond with the factors outlined in Miller, the
statutes and regulations governing parole for juvenile lifers provide no
discernable standard for how the Maryland Parole Commission or Governor
should weigh those factors in parole determinations.
Facial consideration of youth-related factors without an emphasis on a
juvenile offender's rehabilitation does not fulfill the obligations of Graham
and Miller. Maryland's parole system must have procedures to ensure that
juvenile lifers are able to adequately present information related to the
mitigating circumstances of youth and must also adopt a standard that gives
those circumstances sufficient weight. Without hat, parole in Maryland does
not provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful and realistic opportunity for
release. Both the Maryland Court of Appeals and the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland have an opportunity to impose those
standards on the state through pending litigation. In the absence of judicial
action, advocates hould adopt a broader legislative agenda that focuses not
just on removing the governor from the parole process, but on amending the
law to ensure juvenile offenders are given a meaningful opportunity for
release throughout the process.
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COMMENT
BALTIMORE CITY SCHOOLS NEED MANY THINGS - A
PERSONAL POLICE FORCE IS NOT ONE OF THEM
By: Kelli L. Cover*
INTRODUCTION
"When children attend schools that place a greater value on discipline and
security than on knowledge and intellectual development, they are attending
prep schools for prison."' This is one example through which Angela Davis
explained the damaging impacts of systems that replicate the structures of
prisons, particularly on poor communities of color.2 Baltimore City schools
have seen numerous recent incidents of school police officers using
unwarranted force against children on school grounds. While disturbing
videos of young children being treated violently in schools at the hands of
police officers have been emerging nationwide, the presence of officers within
the schools of Baltimore City is particularly unique because of the Baltimore
City School District's dedicated police force.3
In 2014, a Baltimore City School Police officer struck a 13-year-old female
student over the head with her baton and pepper sprayed two additional female
students at Vanguard Collegiate Middle School.4 The officer was eventually
* J.D. 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank my
faculty advisor, Gilda Daniels, for her guidance and support, as well as the entire
University of Baltimore Law Forum staff for their hard work throughout this process.
Finally, my extraordinary thanks go to the numerous people within the Baltimore
community tirelessly advocating for institutional reform.
1 Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 38-9 (Seven Stories Press ed., 2003).
2 Id
' See Deputy Who Tossed a S.C. High School Student Won't Be Charged, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/aftemoonupdate/deputy-
who-tossed-a-sc-high-school-student-wont-be-charged.html (school resource officer
recorded flipping a female student in her desk to the floor and dragging her for
refusing to surrender her cell phone); see also Emma Brown, Judge: Police can no




school/?utm term-.d5c5b8 1e9df4 (describing the routine use of pepper spray on
students, including an officer spraying a pregnant 15-year-old student when she
would not stop crying).
4 See Danielle Sweeney, Amid debate over arming school police officers, one of them
is indicted for assault and theft, BALTIMORE BREW (Mar. 2, 2015)
https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2015/03/02/amid-debate-over-arming-school-
police-officers-one-of-them-is-indicted-for-assault-and-theft/; See also Evan Serpick,
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charged with one count of first-degree assault, three counts of second-degree
assault, and three counts of reckless endangerment. Ultimately, she pled guilty
to three counts of second-degree assault.' All three girls - ages 11, 13, and 14
- were handcuffed, arrested, and charged with assault.6 They were brought
before a judge and expelled from school before the criminal charges were
eventually dropped when video surfaced of the violent attack.7 Further, on
March 1, 2016, a Baltimore school police officer slapped and kicked a 16-
year-old teenager on the steps outside REACH Partnership School, a city high
school, while another officer watched.' In 2002, a Baltimore School Police
Officer shot and killed a 14-year-old boy who was smoking and drinking
behind a Northeast Baltimore elementary school.9
"As the only district in the state of Maryland that functions in this way, I
believe now more than ever that there has to be a serious reassessment of the
function and purpose of Baltimore city public schools operating as a police
department," stated Senator Bill Ferguson, following the release of the Report
of the Department of Justice's investigation of the Baltimore Police
Department.o It is necessary to evaluate the impact of the Baltimore City
School Police Force and prioritize ensuring that schools are not criminalizing
students and leading them into the school-to-prison pipeline. This comment
proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the history of school police officers
and the battle for equitable school funding in Baltimore City. Part II examines
several issues arising as a consequence of the Baltimore City School Police
Force, including the inappropriate practices used by the force, the need for
school funding, and the criminalization of youth and the particularly disparate
impact this has on students of color, the LGBTQ community, and students with
disabilities. Part III proposes that Maryland should eliminate the Baltimore
Statement on School Police, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE-BALTImORE (Mar. 2, 2016)
https://www.osibaltimore.org/2016/03/statement-on-school-police/.
' Sweeney, supra note 4; Serpick, supra note 4.




Liz Bowie & Kevin Rector, Criminal investigation launched after video shows
school police officer slapping young man, THE BALT. SUN (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/education/blog/bs-md-ci-school-
slapping-video-20160301-story.html.
9 Del Quentin Wilber & Liz Bowie, Officer pleaded guilty in '01 case, THE BALT.
SUN (Apr. 10, 2002), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-04-
1 0/news/0204100042 1 lynch-samuel-probation-before-judgment.
10 Erica L. Green, Justice Department report cites lapse in school police
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City School Police Force and shift the significant resources saved to support
initiatives that are better suited to serve holistic community needs and foster
safe learning environments.
I. IHSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The heightened use of police officers in schools nationwide has facilitated
harsh responses to minor disciplinary issues, contributed to mass
incarceration, particularly within low-income communities of color, and
created a prison-like environment in schools." Based on increased policing,
schools have changed their responses to discipline and consequently increased
the criminalization of misbehavior.12 Despite potentially harmful impacts
police and school resource officers have on students, the programs have
continued to expand with minimal evaluation of their effectiveness.13
The history of the presence of police officers in schools dates back to the
1950s, however, federal funding began to significantly increase as a response
to school shootings in the 1990s.14 In 1999, following the shooting at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, the Department of Justice
Office of Community Policing Services initiated the "COPS in Schools"
program. This program has led to a shift from the discretion of school
personnel toward the formalization of responses to school discipline, such as
zero-tolerance policies, which have greatly increased the number of students
being removed from the education system and placed into the criminal justice
system. 16
In 1975, only one percent of the country's school principals reported police
stationed in the school.17 In 1997, principals in twenty-two percent of schools
" NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., LOCKED OUT OF THE
CLASSROOM: How IMPLICIT BIAS CONTRIBUTES TO DISPARITIES IN SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE 6-10 (2017); Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE PRELIMINARY REPORT 51-52 (FEB.
2016).
12 Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-To-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U.
L. REv. 919, 937 (2016).
13 Redfield & Nance, supra note 11.
14 Connie Mulqueen, School Resource Officers: More Than Security Guards, 71 AM.
SCHOOL & UNIV. 11, 17(1999).
" Chonhmin Na & Denisie Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on
School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 4,
619, 621 (2013).
16 Randall R. Beger, Expansion ofPolice Power in Public Schools and the Vanishing
Rights of Students, 29.5 SOCIAL JUSTICE 119, 123 (Alt-PressWatch 2002).
" Na & Gottfredson, supra note 15, at 619-20.
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reported an officer placed at the school for at least one hour a week, and by
2008, the percentage had risen to forty percent.'8  Although the original
reactionary plan to increase police presence in schools was arguably sensible,
it is unclear why this presence continues to increase despite the trends of
decreased crime in schools.19 Law enforcement officers are often equated with
increased safety, however, provided the already rampant, growing distrust
seen between communities in Baltimore and the police, it must be recognized
that overuse and misuse of officers in schools may likely lead to further
resentment and distrust of police by people at an even younger age.20 Negative
and unnecessary interactions with police in schools can, in turn, affect the long
term relationships within society-at-large.2 1
A. Police in Baltimore City Schools
In 1967, after several highly publicized events at junior high schools in the
city, Baltimore City Public Schools ("BCPS") created a security division.2 2 At
this point, administrators decided that employees who were hired by, and
responsible to, the school system could better address their problems than an
outside agency.23  Upon creation, it consisted of a total of twenty-one
positions.24 After years of expansion, the division was redesigned in 1984,
when it was found that "the word 'security' no longer adequately described
the authority, duties, or responsibility of the agency," ultimately leading to the
creation of the Baltimore City School Police Force ("BCSPF").25 In 1991, the
Maryland General Assembly passed Senate Bill 552 to align the BSCPF with
the Maryland Police Training Commission, making the force certified and
sworn police officers.26 In 1997, the Baltimore Police Commissioner assisted
the School Police department in creating a Criminal Investigation Division,
27
Truancy Unit, and Internal Affairs Division. Further, a Community Affairs
Unit and a City Wide Safety Patrol program were developed in 2005.28
18 Id.
19 Id. at 622.
20 Ending the Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track, THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
(Nov.20, 2016), http://safequalityschools.org/pages/get-involved-law-enforcement.
21 Id.
22 School Police History, BALT. CITY PUB. SCHOOLS,




26 S.B. 552, 1991 Leg., 401st Sess. (Md. 1991) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §
4-306) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318).
27 School Police History, supra note 22.
28 Id.
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Throughout Maryland, the use of School Resource Officers, generally
known as SROs, is initiated by the Maryland Center for School Safety through
a collaborative partnership between school systems and law enforcement.29
Maryland defines SROs as a law enforcement officer who has been assigned
to a school in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the
chief of a law enforcement agency and the local education agency.30 SROs
perform a variety of tasks, including patrolling the school grounds,
investigating students who break rules, arresting students who commit crimes,
and other non-traditional law enforcement functions such as chaperoning
events and counseling students.
Out of twenty-four school districts in Maryland, Baltimore City is the only
jurisdiction that employs its own designated school police force, as opposed
to using SROs.32 On the contrary, BCSPF officers are employees of the
Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners.3 3 They enjoy "all the powers
of a law enforcement officer in the state," including arrest powers.34 Despite
the statutorily imposed limitations on the jurisdiction of BCSPF officers when
they are not on school property, a "Concurrent Jurisdiction Agreement" with
the Baltimore Police Department has allowed BCSPF to usurp expanded
authority.35 This agreement extends the statutory jurisdiction of the School
Police to cover the entire city, regardless of whether or not the officers are
addressing issues related to schools.3 6 Further, "City School police officers
receive the same training as other sworn Police Officers in the state of
Maryland."3 7 There is no additional training or education statutorily required
for School Police officers.
Unlike the other school districts across Maryland, Baltimore City Public
Schools directly funds their distinct police force.38 In fiscal year 2016, the
actual expenditures dedicated to School Police totaled nearly 13 million
29 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-1502.
30 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 26-102.
31 Beger, supra note 16 at 121.
32 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318.
33 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318(c).
34 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318 (d)(1).
35 School Police Authority, BALT. CITY PUB. SCHOOLS,
www.cityschoolsinside.bcps.kl2.mcus/Departments/SchoolPolice/Authority.asp
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
36 Id.
" Id.; See, e.g., C.O.M.A.R. 12.04.01.12.
38 BALT. CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, OPERATING BUDGET 2017-2018: PROPOSAL TO THE
BALT. CITY BOARD OF SCH. COMM'R 91 (2017),
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/cms/lib/MD0100135 1/Centricity/Domain/805 1/
FY2018_ProposedBudget.pdf.
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dollars.39 As of May 2015, there were 132 School Police patrol personnel,
with an average salary of $56,296.40 While the Baltimore Police Department
budget continues to increase exponentially, jumping from $347.11 million to
$471.63 million between 2012 and 2017,41 despite scant evidence of its
positive impact on public safety, funding to the city schools remains fairly
stagnant. In 2012, the Baltimore City Public Schools' budget was $249.25
million, and in 2017, it had increased to $265.41 million.42 Regardless of the
dire need, a significant portion of the budget for Baltimore City Public Schools
continues to be allocated towards further policing their students and city
residents, while city school teachers are crowdfunding for space heaters to
protect their students from dangerously cold classrooms.43
B. The City's Battle for Equitable School Funding
Closures due to inadequate heating in Baltimore City schools made news
headlines nationwide in early 2018, and funding inequities have come to the
forefront of discussion once again." While funding continues to flow into
waterfront developments,45 the Baltimore Police Department," and a $35
39 Id.
40 Letter from Gregory E. Thorton, CEO, Balt. City Public Schools, to Sen.
Ferguson, Del. Haynes, Del. Lierman, Del. McIntosh, & Del. Robinson, 1-20, 3,
(May 1, 2015).
41 BALT. CITY OPEN BUDGET, Safe Neighborhoods Broken Down by Dept., (2018),
http://openbudget.baltimorecity.gov/#!/year/2018/operating/0/service/Safe+Neighbor
hoods/0/department?vis=lineChart.
42 BALT. CITY OPEN BUDGET, Operating Budget Broken Down by Program, (2018),
http://openbudget.baltimorecity.gov/#!/year/2018/operating/0/program?vis=lineChar
t.
43 Emily Shapiro, After Uproar over Kids' Enduring Cold Schools, Fundraising and
Repairs Underway, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2018, 3:08 PM),
http://abcnews.go.comfUS/uproar-kids-citys-cold-schools-fundraising-repairs-
underway/story?id=52178327; see also supra note 95-96.
44 Madison Park, Baltimore Closes Public Schools after Students Sat in Cold
Classrooms, CNN (Jan. 3, 2018, 2:26 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/us/baltimore-schools-cold/index.html; see also
Christine Hauser, Baltimore City Schools Are Without Heat, Prompting Protests
From Teachers and Parents, NY TIMEs (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/baltimore-schools-winter-heating.html.
" Luke Broadwater, City Council Approves $660 Million Bond Deal for Port
Covington Project, THE BALT. SUN (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:50 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/politics/bs-md-ci-port-
covington-council-20160919-story.html.
46 BALT. CITY OPEN BUDGET, supra note 41.
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million dollar youth detention center,47 city school students continue to be
neglected. While Governor Hogan quickly chided school leaders for
"ineptness and mismanagement,"48 a Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners Chair explained that maintenance funding issues are more
complicated than state lawmakers claim.4 9 Governor Hogan's statements fail
to contextualize the fiscal challenges. He stated that Baltimore City may be
one of the "most highly funded school systems in America," yet it does not
even receive the most per-pupil funding in the state of Maryland.50 However,
the battle over funding between the State and Baltimore City Public Schools
has a long history in both the courts and the legislature.
Article VIII of the Constitution of Maryland requires the Legislature to
establish a "thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools" and
"provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance."5 1 Public schools
rely on funding from federal, state, and local sources.52 In its 1954 decision
Brown v. Board of Education, ruling that racially segregated schools are
"inherently unequal," the United States Supreme Court labeled public
education as "the most important function of state and local governments."53
47 Jessica Anderson, State Opens $35 Million Youth Detention Facility in Balt., THE
BALT. SUN (Sept. 8, 2017, 1:45 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-new-youth-jail-
20170907-story.html.
48 Luke Broadwater & Michael Dresser, Lawmakers Call for Fixes to Help Freezing
Schools, while Hogan Blasts Baltimore 'Mismanagement', THE BALT. SUN (Jan. 5,
2018, 3:25 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/Maryland/Baltimore-city/bs-
md-ci-schools-update-20180105-story.html.
" Letter from Cheryl A. Casciani, Chair, Balt. City Bd. of Comm'rs, to Editor, THE
BALT. SuN (Jan. 5, 2018),
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/cms/lib/MD0100135 1/Centricity/Domain/9714/
20180105_LettertoEditor-Final.pdf
' Jess Gartner, A Fact/Reality Check on Gov. Hogan's Baltimore Schools Claim,
THE BALT. SUN (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:45 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0 112-hogan-schools-
201801 10-story.html.
5' MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
52 STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF LEG. SERVS., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, OVERVIEW OF
MD. LOCAL Gov'Ts, FINANCES AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFO. 85 (Jan. 2018),
http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/InterGovMatters/LocFinTaxRte/Overvew-of-
Maryland-Local-Govemments-2018.pdf.
5 Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691 (1954); see also U.S.
COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, Public Education Funding Inequity in an Era of
Increasing Concentration ofPoverty and Resegegration (Jan. 2018),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018-01-1 0-Education-Inequity.pdf (This is an extensive
report that reviews racial inequities nationwide in the public education funding
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On average in Maryland, 47.2 percent of public school funding is accounted
for through local sources, while the State provides for 48.3 percent.54
Baltimore City is one of seven local school systems who depend on the State
for over 60 percent of their funding."
In 1979, the School Commissioners of Baltimore City, the Boards of
Education of Somerset, Caroline, and St. Mary's Counties, as well as
taxpayers, students, parents, and public officials, challenged Maryland's
school finance formula in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board ofEducation.56
In 1983, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the challenge to the state's
funding system, holding that the Maryland Constitution did not mandate equal
per-pupil spending among the districts.57 The court interpreted the Maryland
Constitution to require that public schools provide all students with an
education that is adequate when measured by contemporary education
standards.5 8  Further, the court explained that a showing that educational
resources in poorer school districts are "inferior to those in the rich districts"
does not lead to a conclusion that the state financing system is providing
insufficient funding for students to obtain an adequate education.59 Despite
this ruling, the state failed to change the funding formula.
In 1992, then Mayor Kurt Schmoke announced that the City would join the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") in a lawsuit and once again take
the State to court over school funding, explaining that the City "need[s] some
kind of judicial intervention to get some kind of meaningful reform."60
Governor Schaefer, who served as the mayor of Baltimore City in 1979 when
it sued the State concerning the same issue, encouraged Schmoke and other
Baltimore leaders to resolve the problem within the political process.61
Schaefer appointed a commission to review and recommend changes to the
school funding formula, and Schmoke agreed to drop the city's support of the
lawsuit, leaving local educational activists disappointed and doubtful that
another commission would result in meaningful change.62
structure. It is necessary to view this discussion with a lens that is focused on the
extreme racial disparities in Baltimore and this report provides further discussion of
the underlying issues presumed understood in this comment).
54 U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, supra note 53.
5 Id. (Allegany, Caroline, Dorchester, Somerset, Washington, and Wicomico
counties also receive more than 60% of their revenue from the state).
56 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. OfEduc., 295 Md. 597, 607, 458 A.2d 758,764
(1983).
s7 Id. at 619.
5s Id.
59 Id. at 639.
60 Marion Orr, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM IN
BALTIMORE, 1986-1998, at 170 (1999).
1 Id. at 171.
62 Id.
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In January 1994, the Hutchinson Commission released its final report,
which corroborated Baltimore City Public Schools' claims that, without more
resources, they could not be expected to meet state standards.63 The report
concluded that the proportion of students living in or near poverty is the best
predictor of school results, that Baltimore City had the highest percentage of
poor students, and that high poverty schools should be targeted for increased
state funding.' While the commission's final report recommended an increase
totaling $500 million over five years in state funds for the Baltimore City
Public School Systems, the issue of Baltimore school funding was left
unresolved after aggressive opposition from legislators of wealthier suburban
counties.65
Baltimore City Public Schools, with the support of Mayor Schmoke and the
Maryland chapter of the ACLU, again filed a lawsuit in 1994, arguing that the
children in Baltimore City Public Schools were not receiving an "adequate"
education to which they are entitled under the Maryland State Constitution,
rather than the 1979 argument that funding was unequal in Hornbeck.66 They
also sought clarification of the Hornbeck decision, requesting that the court
define "adequacy" in public education.67 Mayor Schmoke again abandoned
the lawsuit after Governor Glendening believed he could work with legislators
in Montgomery County to resolve the funding issue, however, the ACLU
continued challenging the constitutionality of the funding disparities.6 8 While
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City agreed that Baltimore City public school
students were not receiving an "adequate" education, as guaranteed by
Maryland's Constitution, the court never addressed the remaining issue of
defining what "adequacy" means in public education.69  Rather than
continuing in the uncertainty of the courts, the State and Baltimore City Public
Schools entered into the "City-State Partnership Agreement," which increased
state funding to BCPS and provided for increased participation by the State in
control and management of the city's schools.70
Unfortunately, the battles have not subsided over the years, resulting in a
continued failure to provide the necessary educational support and structure to
the youth of Baltimore City. While the fight to increase the budget for
Baltimore City Public Schools remains uncertain, it is necessary for the school
63 Id. at 172.
6 Id.
6 Nettie E. Legters, et al., Comprehensive Reform for Urban High Schools: A Talent
Development Approach, at 45 (2002).
6 6 Maryland State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bradford, 387 Md. 353, 361-62 (2005).
67 Id.
68 Orr, supra note 60, at 177.
6' Laura Chechovich, Policy Brief, Financing Public Education in Maryland: A Brief
History, MARYLAND EQUITY PROJECT (Sept. 2016) at 1.
70 Id. at 3.
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system to look to how they can address the needs of students from the budget
they have available. By reallocating the significant sum spent on the school
police force, Baltimore City Public Schools can increase funding to programs
that provide the necessary support and structure to learn and achieve.
II. ISSUE
Numerous troubling practices of the dedicated police force for Baltimore
City schools raise doubt regarding their effectiveness in protecting the best
interests of students. The School Police have failed to comply with current
state law and lack appropriate training focused on addressing children's issues
effectively, all the while using funds intended for education to further general
policing in the city. Additionally, extensive research shows disturbing
connections between policing school discipline and the introduction of
children to the criminal justice system. The impacts of these issues, most
significantly zero-tolerance policies, have been shown to have a severely
disproportional impact on youth with disabilities, LGBTQ youth, and youth of
color.
A. Practices of the Baltimore City School Police Force Fail to Address
Needs of School Children
The distinctions, or lack of, between the Baltimore Police Department
("BPD") and the Baltimore City School Police Force are very uncertain, and
lack appropriate policies, procedures, and oversight authority. In August
2016, following an investigation spanning over a year, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") released a scathing 163-page report on the practices of the
Baltimore Police Department." The investigation found that school police
officers have been increasingly used by the Baltimore Police Department to
compensate when they are understaffed.7 2
The school police officer's jurisdiction is statutorily limited to "the
premises of schools and any other property used for educational purposes
owned, leased, or operated by, or under the control of the Baltimore City Board
of School Commissioners."73 However, their reach is expanded greatly
through the authorization to "exercise full police power anywhere within the
jurisdiction of the City of Baltimore" in a memorandum of understanding
between BPD and the Baltimore City Public School System.74 This agreement
allows the officers to lawfully act throughout the city of Baltimore, including
the power to arrest, as well as assist in active and follow-up investigations.75
7n U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., C.R. DIv., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police
Department (2016).
72 Id. at 16.
73 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §4-318(d)(2)(i) (2017).
74 U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 71, at 16.
7 Id. at 154.
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The DOJ expressed numerous concerns with the agreement between BPD
and the school system, including the lack of clarification regarding which
agency is in charge of an incident when officers from both agencies respond,
which agency's policies control decisions made about an incident, the lack of
a defined process for handling complaints of officer misconduct, and improper
collection and analysis of data from arrest and field reports when school police
officers aid BPD.76 They found that these create risks for the officers and the
public, leave gaps in accountability for both agencies, and undermine
community confidence.77 Further, they reported that the lack of properly
collected data impacts the ability of both BPD and the school police to
supervise their officers effectively.
Under current state law, officers are not permitted to routinely carry guns
in school buildings during the regular school days, but can access their
weapons in the event of a threat.7 9 Baltimore City school officials recently
advocated for controversial legislation that would allow school police officers
to carry their guns regularly in school buildings.80 Senator Conway introduced
Senate Bill 17 in 2015, which proposed the statutory amendment to remove
the restrictions on when school police officers are authorized to carry firearms
on school property.81 Regardless, officers have been repeatedly found to have
been doing so, in violation of state law, for years.82 Furthermore, Maryland
Code provides an exception for police officers to carry guns on school
campuses, making a prosecution under Education Article § 4-318 difficult. 8 3
The Baltimore City School Police Force officers are trained through the
Maryland Police Training Commission and the Civil Service Commission of
Baltimore City and are not required to undergo any form of specialized
training related to working with young people, such as adolescent
development, mental health, or trauma intervention. According to Gregory
Thornton, prior Baltimore City Public Schools CEO, the City Schools police
officers annual required training is the same as all other sworn Maryland police
76 Id. at 154-55.
7 Id.
78 Id. at 155.
7 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318(d)(3)(i).
" Baltimore City School Police Force - Carrying of Firearms, S.B. 17, 114th Cong.
(2016).
81 Id.
82 Erica Green, Justice Department Report Cites Lapse in School Police
Accountability, THE BALT. SUN (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/education/bs-md-ci-doj-school-police-
20160810-story.html].
83 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-102(a)(1).
84 MD. CODE ANN. EDUC., § 4-318.
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officers. It is essential for law enforcement officers, particularly those who
are working within schools, to have such training in order to understand the
differences in children and youth, and subsequently, how to appropriately
respond to the young people they are hired to serve and protect.
Several Baltimore City School Police Force training documents were
obtained by Mother Jones, including trainings on firearms, cultural sensitivity,
and dealing with students with chronic absences and developmental
disabilities. One training document contained a lesson teaching
"professionalism through the framework of scholar, statesmen, warrior."87
These training documents contain quotes from "One Warrior's Creed," which
states, "You may defeat me, but you will pay a severe price and will be lucky
to escape with your life...."8 These training materials are especially troubling
given the lack of requirements regarding training that emphasizes
understanding adolescent behavior.
When officers are present in the school environment, their duties often
become blurred with the traditional duties of school officials, particularly
concerning students who are seen as disruptive or disorderly. 89 Furthermore,
the lack of appropriate training leads to dependence on police intervention by
the school staff, resulting in decreased attention to training of school faculty,
staff, and administration in regard to handling adolescent behavioral issues
appropriately.90 "One of the primary reasons for the over-reliance on punitive
disciplinary measures is that many teachers and administrators have received
insufficient training in classroom management, conflict resolution, and non-
punitive approaches to discipline."91 A September 2016 Memo from then
Acting Chief of School Police, Akil Hamm, to the Baltimore City School
Police Force briefly outlines guidelines "to ensure that our interactions with
students build trust so that discipline issues and issues of student misbehavior
8 Letter from Gregory E. Thorton, CEO, Baltimore City Public Schools, to Sen.
Ferguson, Del. Haynes, Del. Lierman, Del. McIntosh, and Del. Robinson (May 1,
2015).
86 Jaeah Lee, These Documents Show How Baltimore School Cops Are Trained to Be
"Warriors," MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/baltimore-school-police-training-
beating-video.
8 Id. (citing Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions Lesson Plan,
In-Service Training, The Professional: Scholar, statesmen, warrior, Jeffrey Jones
(April 2015)).
SId. at 34.
89 Redfield & Nance, supra note 13, at 53.
901Id.
91 Model School Discipline Policy, THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT at 3,
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/e2942400eda9feb9b5_9cm6vql 12.pdf.
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[]can be left to administrators and educators,"92 however, the boundaries lack
the detail necessary to provide for a meaningful change in practices. Rather
than depend on policing, school administration and staff must understand how
to handle behavior and disciplinary needs, and must be provided the resources
to do so effectively and efficiently.
B. Funds Allocated for Education Are Used to Further City Policing
SROs in school districts state-wide are funded by local police
departments,93 however, this is not the case for the Baltimore City School
Police Force, which is a division of the Baltimore City Public Schools." In
fiscal year 2016, City Schools spent $12,848,800 on the school police force.95
Based on the Department of Justice Report's findings of extensive overlap
between the BPD and the BCSPF, enough to call it an "auxiliary force," it is
likely that significant sums of money budgeted for the Baltimore City Schools
funds general policing of the city, rather than providing much needed
resources to city school children.96
This correlation is further disturbed by looking to trends in Baltimore's
Operating Budget, where police funding continues to rise, despite a lack of
correlation between increased public safety or decreased violence. 9 Of the
$2.65 billion-dollar Operating Budget for fiscal year 2017, 28 percent of that
is allocated to public safety, while only 12 percent is focused on education. 98
City Councilman Bill Henry explained that, over the last generation, the city
has increased spending "to deter and catch criminals by 200 percent, but we've
only increased what we invest in the programs most likely to keep our children
92 Memorandum from Akil L. Hamm, Acting Chief of School Police to Baltimore
City Police Force (Sept. 28, 2016).
93 Adequacy Study: Draft Final Report, APA CONSULTING, prepared for Maryland
State Department of Education at 94 (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/Documents/adequacystudy/AdequacyStudyD
raftReport09302016.pdf.
94 BALTIMORE CITY SCHOOLS, BALTIMORE SCHOOL POLICE FORCE, General Order
10-4, Section B-1, Organizational Structure (April 23, 2013),
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/cms/lib/MD0100135 1/Centricity/domain/803 8/
generalorders/10-4_OrganizationalStructure_042413.pdf
95 BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS PROPOSED FY 18 OPERATING BUDGET AT 91
(May 9, 2017),
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/cms/ib/MD0 100135 1/Centricity/Domain/805 1/
FY2018_ProposedBudget.pdf.
96 Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Dept., supra note 71.
9 BALT. CITY OPEN BUDGET, supra note 41.
9 City of Baltimore Board of Estimates Recommendations, Executive Summary,
Fiscal Year 2017, at 78.
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from becoming criminals in the first place by 27 percent."99 Additionally,
Councilman Henry noted that the department's half-a-billion dollar budget is
nearly 50 percent more than what the city spends on public schools. 10
C. Criminalizing School Discipline Leads Children into the School-to-
Prison Pipeline
Following the uprising in Baltimore after the murder of Freddie Gray in
April of 2015, then Principal of Edmondson-Westside High School, Karl
Perry, stated that he would "return to zero-tolerance enforcement of my
expectations for appropriate behaviors."10 1 Two months later, Perry was
named the chief school supports officer, responsible for overseeing the school
police, as well as attendance, suspensions, enrollment, and athletics.10 2 Zero-
tolerance policies require harsh punishments for infractions that do not involve
a real threat to safety of students or staff, such as talking back or poor
attendance, and, in some instances, provide teachers with an excuse to remove
children they find to be troublesome or disruptive from the classroom.'03
While the continuous increases in police spending fail to correlate to a
decrease in crime rates, extensive empirical data shows that the chance
children will successfully complete school diminishes once they have a
punitive interaction with police.' The use of officers in schools tends to
contribute to an increase of youth in the juvenile justice system and
disproportionately impacts youth of color, LGBTQ youth, and youth with
disabilities.s 'While disciplinary decisions are often made by teachers, school
officials, or officers, they are critical to the education of young people and are
generally discretionary, individual choices and are likely impacted by implicit
biases. 1
9 Bill Henry, Baltimore can't police itself out of its problems, THE BALT. SUN (Nov.
8, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-
1 109-our-future-20171108-story.html.
100 Id.
o Erica Green, Inspired by unrest, Karl Perry works to redefine city school climate,




103 Keep them in class, Editorial, THE BALT. SUN (Jan. 29, 2014, 12:00 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-schools-suspensions-
20140129-story.html.
104 Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption ofHigh School Education by
Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 4 462, at 464 (Dec. 2006).
"o Redfield & Nance, supra note 13.
106 Id. at 54-55.
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Punishing adolescent behavior and low-level offenses leads to the
"creation" of criminals by arresting youth for what is generally seen as normal,
juvenile behavior.107 Jenny Egan, a juvenile public defender in Baltimore,
explained that, "[w]hen we put police officers in school who aren't trained,
who don't know anything about adolescent development, and you tell them
this is a crime, they're going to do what police are trained to do - arrest
people."o8 Significant differences exist between children and adults, as
recognized by the Supreme Court, stating that "[o]ur history is replete with
laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults."1" Further, the effects
of involvement with the juvenile justice system on educational outcome has
shown to be extremely detrimental. Students who are arrested for the first time
in high school face nearly doubled odds that they will drop out, even if they
never go to court.110 With a court appearance, the likeliness of dropping out
increases by nearly four times." These numbers become especially startling
when looked at next to Baltimore City arrest data. While only ten percent of
Maryland's K- 12 school population are in Baltimore City Public Schools, they
account for forty-five percent of Maryland children arrested in schools.1 12
Despite the large number of arrests, based on an analysis of school-based
arrests from 2013-2015, nearly three-quarters of the cases involving youth
arrests result in dismissals or are found not guilty. 113 Furthermore, only four
percent of all arrests or referrals were found delinquent of a felony offense.114
During the 2014 calendar year, there were 383 student arrests, 34 percent of
107 Akiva M. Liberman, et al., Labeling Effects ofFirst Juvenile Arrests: Secondary
Deviance and Secondary Sanctioning, 52 CRIMIOLOGY 345 (2014) (discussing the
effects of first arrests on subsequent offending and arrests through the use of labeling
theory).
108 Julia Craven, Baltimore School Cops'Abuse ofKids is Rooted in City's Racist
History, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/baltimore-school-
police us_57b227f7e4b007c36e4fcb44.
10' Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982). See also Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
110 Sweeten, supra note 104, at 473.
n Id.
112 Craven, supra note 108 (citing Jenny Egan, Presentation MD Office of the Public
Defender, Juvenile Division of Baltimore City, 2016 School-Based Arrests in
Baltimore (May 19, 2016)).
113 Id.
114 Jenny Egan, Presentation, MD Office of the Public Defender, Juvenile Division of
Baltimore City, 2016 School-Based Arrests in Baltimore (May 19, 2016),
https://prezi.com/43dcfxjgurul/2016-school-based-arrests-in-baltimore/.
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which resulted from incidents of trespassing, disorderly conduct, and common
assault, which is generally from fighting.1 15 It is significant to acknowledge
that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 introduced requirements regarding
the reporting of suspensions and expulsions, but not school-based arrests.116
The lack of required reporting for school based arrests creates motivation to
move to different forms of consequences available when schools are able to
avoid reporting data that may have a negative impact on their school. For
example, a preliminary report by the American Bar Association expressed
concerns regarding school officials referring low-performing students to the
juvenile justice system in order to prevent low test scores from negatively
impacting their schools."
D. Police Based Discipline Policies Have a Disproportionate Impact on
Youth of Color, LGBTQ youth, and Youth with Disabilities
Over-policing of youth, as well as the use of zero-tolerance policies, are
consistently shown to disproportionately impact people of color, LGBTQ
youth, and youth with disabilities or mental illnesses. As of September 2016,
on average in Maryland, the racial composition in schools is 38.2 percent
White and 34.1 percent African American."8 In Baltimore, public schools are
7.9 percent White and 80.6 percent African American.119 While the use of
school police continues to grow, most schools still do not have police.'20
However, school policing disproportionately impacts students of color, as 51
percent of high schools with majority Black and Latino enrollment reported
having law enforcement on campus in 2013, while this was true for only 42
percent of high schools overall.121 According to nationwide federal data,
Black children made up only 16 percent of all enrolled children in 2011-12,
however, they accounted for 31 percent of all in-school arrests.122 Compared
to other Maryland school districts, City Schools serve more students with
1"s Letter from Monique L. Dixon, Deputy Dir. of Policy and Senior Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, to Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div. (Sept. 8, 2015) (citing
Baltimore City School Police, 2014 Baltimore City School Police Arrest Data).
'16 Preliminary Overview ofPrograms and Changes Included in the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/progsum/sum-pg9.html.
117 Redfield & Nance, supra note 13, at 27.
118 Department of Legislative Services, Overview of Maryland Local Governments
Finances and Demographic Information (2017).
119 Id.
120 Bullies in Blue, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, April 2017, at 11.
121 Id.
122 Libby Nelson & Dara Lind, The School to Prison Pipeline, Explained, JUST.
POL'Y INST. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/8775.
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higher needs, including students with disabilities, students living in extreme
poverty, and students who have experienced trauma in their lives and
communities, and spends more on each of those students.123
Additionally, LGBTQ and gender non-conforming youth are often
victimized and disciplined more harshly within the school and juvenile justice
systems.124 Students with disabilities are disproportionately students of color,
especially within discretionary categories.125 Further, youth who identify in
more than one of these categories are particularly negatively impacted.'26 As
a result, these children are at an extraordinarily high risk of punishment, and
are often denied an opportunity to learn, which can lead to lifetimes of
detrimental consequences.
HI. SOLUTION
A. Shift Resources Towards a School System Committed to Sustainable
Practices Focused on the Holistic Needs of the Community
Baltimore City's use of school police is only one of many issues currently
facing students and potential solutions involve a multifaceted approach. Most
significantly, the Baltimore City School Police Force should be disbanded.
Further, while the use of school resource officers is far from perfect, the
Baltimore City School District should establish a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Baltimore Police Department in order to incorporate
school resource officers in city schools to address immediate threats to
physical safety, as opposed to routine policing. The funding previously
allocated for the School Police should be invested in resources that are linked
to long-term impacts on public safety and address the mental and physical
health, housing needs, and economic opportunities of Baltimore students and
their communities.
B. Eliminate the Baltimore City School Police Force
Section 4-318 of the Education Article of the Maryland State Code should
be repealed.12 7 There have been numerous attempts to make changes, which
have either not been implemented or refused altogether. As stated in their
recommendations for the Consent Decree between the Department of Justice
and the Baltimore Police Department, the Maryland Office of the Public
123 BALT. CITY PUB. SCH., supra note 38, at 7.
124 Redfield & Nance, supra note 13, at 41.
125 Id. at 34.
126 Id. at 35.
127 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-318.
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Defender supports abolishing the BCSPF.128 Based on the arrest data reports
showing the high number of dismissals and types of crimes being charged by
the school police, it is necessary to decrease the role of law enforcement in our
schools.129 In order to avoid unnecessary criminalization of students, police
involvement must be limited to circumstances where it is necessary to protect
the physical safety of students and staff or to address situations involving
criminal behavior of persons other than students.130 It is imperative to address
misbehavior using consequences focused on the student and using school-
based resources, rather than criminal justice relief. The consequences imposed
on our youth need to be "reasonable, timely, fair, age-appropriate, and should
match the severity of the student's misbehavior."1 31 Further, to the extent
police involvement is present in our school systems, it is necessary to establish
well-developed selection and training criteria for SROs.
The U.S. Department of Education and Department of Justice have
designed a policy rubric, SECURe, to provide information related to
incorporating SROs into school learning environments, with the goal of
"preventing unnecessary or inappropriate arrests, referrals to law enforcement,
contact with the juvenile justice system, and violations of civil rights laws." 1 32
This rubric provides examples of policies used throughout the country that
promote the establishment of responsible school-police partnerships.13 3
SECURe action steps include the recruiting and hiring of effective SROs and
school personnel, as well as methods to keep those hired well-trained.13 4 The
rubric recommends requiring that prospective SROs are trained regarding
youth development and "listing all required and ongoing trainings, and
supervisory structures, for SROs and staff, with clarity regarding agency
responsibility for each component.",135
For example, a memorandum of understanding used by Denver Public
Schools outlines the training an SRO must have specific to the school assigned,
the supervising agency of the SRO, and a schools' right to request an SROs
128 Maryland Office of the Public Defender Recommendations for the Consent
Decree between the Department ofJustice and the City ofBaltimore, OFFICE OF THE
PUB. DEF., at 31 (Sept. 2016)
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/O/Downloads/OPD%20recs%20for%20DOJ%20
BPD%20consent%20decree.pdf.
129 See Dixon, supra note 115.
130 See Model School Discipline Policy, THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, at 2,
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/e2942400eda9feb9b5_9cm6vql 12.pdf.
13' Id. at 1.
132 U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. & DEPT. OF JUST., SAFE SCHOOL-BASED ENFORCEMENT
THROUGH COLLABORATION, UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT, SECURE, STATE AND
LOCAL POLICY RUBRIC (2016).
133 Id. at 1.
134 Id. at 8.
135 Id.
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removal or re-assignment.13 6 Additionally, a memorandum of understanding
in Broward County, Florida provides an example for defining ways to
minimize arrests for minor school-based offenses, eliminate the involvement
of SROs in non-criminal matters, and clarifies the roles of SROs and school
administrators for addressing discipline of minor student misbehavior.'37 This
agreement uses a "Code of Student Conduct and Discipline Matrix" to guide
responses to particular types of misbehavior, and states that "school officials
should make every effort to connect students to school or community-based
support services, such as counseling, mentoring, or extra-curricular
activities."l38
Mary Washington, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates on the
Education Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, has
stated that she plans to promote solutions to school discipline issues in the
General Assembly by refocusing discipline away from zero tolerance policies,
as well as properly defining the role of School Resource Officers.139 She plans
to refocus on "more moderate discipline" that keeps children in school to learn,
using misbehavior as an opportunity for learning through the implementation
of restorative justice practices and improving training in dealing with children
and teenagers for officers.14 0 Delegate Washington further stated, "[t]here are
proven, research-based strategies to improve results, including making sure all
school personnel have training in conflict mediation and positive behavior
interventions that allow us to resort less quickly to suspensions and even more
serious disciplinary actions. "l41
C. Prioritize Violence Prevention
Violence is often discussed solely in terms of direct, physical violence,
however, it is necessary to broaden the discourse and understand links between
the manifestations of systemic violence.14 2 Many Baltimore youth experience
violent death in their families and community, yet the massive emphasis that
136 Id.
137 Id. at 9-10 (citing Collaborative Agreement on School Discipline, 2.01
Responding to Student Misbehavior, Broward County, FL).
138 Safe School-based Enforcement through Collaboration, Understanding, and
Respect, Secure, State and Local Policy Rubric, supra, note 132, at 9.
139 Mary Washington, Charting the future ofpolice in Baltimore schools, THE BALT.
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Baltimore's budget puts on policing violence, rather than investing resources
in sustainable violence prevention, fails to address the root causes creating this
crisis.14 3 Increasing evidence suggests that youth growing up in urban poverty
are more likely to experience numerous traumatic events that carry long-term
developmental risks and psychological trauma.'" The funding resources
gained by disbanding BCSPF should go towards supportive programs that will
directly support the needs of students in Baltimore, particularly in response to
the negative outcomes stemming from exposure to violence, and empower
them to choose to be successful students and community members.
While police will remain available to address active instances of serious
criminal acts, particularly violent crime, Baltimore City Public Schools should
prioritize their resources on wrap-around services that focus on the holistic
needs of students, including positive alternatives to punitive disciplinary
practices and long-term violence prevention. One method that has been
progressing into City Schools is the introduction of restorative justice
practices.
i. Expand Restorative Justice Programs
The definition of restorative justice practices often varies, but the use as a
practical alternative disciplinary practices has grown.14 5 Some scholars have
described restorative justice practices as creating a sense of community
ownership in all participants in order to resolve issues and build relationships,
as opposed to traditional practices of using punitive and exclusionary
approaches to control student misbehavior.146 Critics of the traditional
approach to school discipline argue that it establishes a power dynamic that is
detrimental to students' ability to express their voice and feel empowered, and
does not facilitate student growth. 147 The implementation of these practices
143 Lawrence Brown, Violence in Baltimore is Rooted in Baltimore's Invisible &
Violent Apartheid, MEDIUM (Jun. 13, 2017)
https://medium.com/@BmoreDoc/violence-in-baltimore-is-rooted-in-baltimores-
invisible-violent-apartheid-d929ad289b2a.
144 Kathryn Collins, Ph.D., et al, Understanding the impact of trauma and urban
poverty on family systems: Risks, resilience, and interventions, FAMILY INFORMED
TRAUMA TREATMENT CENTER, at 11 (2010),
http://nctsn.org/nccts/nav.do?pid=ctr-rsch-prodar; Robert L. Listenbee, et al,
Report of the Attorney General's National Task Force on Children Exposed to
Violence, DEP'T OF JUST. (Dec. 12, 2012), 4-6,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf
145 Trevor Fronius et al., Restorative Justice in US. Schools: A Research Review, 5,
WESTED JUSTICE & PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER (2016).
146 Id. at 6.
147 id.
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"develops students' social-emotional learning, builds community within the
school, and strengthens social and human capital."1 4 8
Through their recent partnership, the Open Society Institute - Baltimore
("OSI-Baltimore") prepared a Baltimore City Schools Restorative Practices
Plan, which emphasized the difficulty in defining this concept. 149 However,
they expressed that most programs aim to produce similar outcomes, including
community safety, reduced racial disparities in school discipline, "a reversal
of the negative academic effects of zero tolerance school discipline policies,"
and reduced contacts between students and police in relation to school
discipline issues.150 OSI-Baltimore has been supporting the use of restorative
practices in city schools since 2006, by providing a number of grants to
community organizations to stem the number of school suspensions and
expulsions and provide more effective options.'5 ' One of the grants in the
initiative went to the Community Conferencing Center, an organization that
continues to partner with them in the current plan, to provide conflict
resolution and violence prevention services to school staff, students, and
families at one elementary school.152 City schools that have implemented
restorative practices through this partnership have reported positive changes
in relationships, as well as school climate.153 By refocusing resources into the
current plan to make Baltimore City Schools a restorative practices district,
efforts and funding can be focused toward shifting school communities away
from a punitive and blame-focused environment to "one that builds
community and provides effective responses to harm."l54
ii. Increase Capacity of the Whole Child Services and Support &
College and Career Readiness Departments
148 Baltimore City Schools Restorative Practices Plan Draft, OPEN Soc'Y INST. -
BALT., 9 (2018).
149 Id. at 7.
150 d.
js' Private Funders Launch $1.5 Million Initiative to Reduce Baltimore's High
Number of School Suspensions and Expulsions, Press Release, OPEN SOCIETY




153 Restorative Practices, BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/Page/32219; see also Restorative Practices in
Baltimore City Public Schools, OPEN Soc'Y INST.- BALT.,
https://www.osibaltimore.org/restorativepractices/.
154 OPEN Soc'Y INST. -BALT., supra note 148, at 3.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
In addition to an increased focus on restorative practices, City Schools
should reallocate funds from the School Police to further develop their Whole
Child Services and Support and College and Career Readiness departments.
The Whole Child Services and Support department leads initiatives
concentrated on "wellness, climate, social-emotional, behavioral, wrap-
around, extension services, and enrichment opportunities that keep the holistic
needs of students, families, and staff at the forefront."155 Strategies include
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS), athletics, and
resilience and trauma-informed practices.156
Further, the College and Career Readiness department works to create an
environment in which students not only learn about postsecondary options, but
are able and committed to pursuing them. 57 It is created to support students
in identifying and pursuing opportunities that "meet their needs, talents, and
interests," and provides programming to ensure that students are able to
successfully transition into postsecondary opportunities.'58 The department
oversees and supports numerous programs geared towards the students' future
beyond high school, including college readiness programs and school
counseling services.159
City Schools spent nearly $13 million on school police in fiscal year 2016,
which is more than the actual expenditures of 2016 on College and Career
Readiness and the proposed 2018 budget for the new Whole Child Services
and Support department combined.16 In fiscal year 2016, the College and
Career Readiness department had a budget of $1,704,293, less than a tenth of
that of the School Police.16' By investing in the services provided by these
departments, the City Schools will be investing in the future of their students
and communities.
D. Advancing the Cause Through Baltimore's Legal Community
More than a century of government policy designed to segregate and
impoverish Baltimore's African American population has pained and
undermined communities.16 2 The Civil Rights Project at UCLA reported that
" BALT. CITY PUB. SCH., OPERATING BUDGET 2017-18: PROPOSAL TO THE
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Maryland was the third-most-segregated state in the United States for African
American students in 2014.163 In 1990, 61.6 percent of Baltimore City
Schools had 90 percent or more students of a racial minority; in 2014, that
number had risen to 75.8 percent.1" In order to address the needs of Baltimore
City school children, we must take an honest look at the consequences of
generations of racial segregation, redlining, urban renewal, and divestment.
When children continue to grow up without safety and stability, our entire
society suffers.
Empowering the students of Baltimore City Public Schools and their
communities is not a challenge that these proposed solutions alone can solve.
However, a collective investment by the legal community, created to support
the greater Baltimore community in developing effective solutions, to provide
holistic legal services is a role which we should prioritize. While there are
numerous sectors that could benefit from legal assistance, the ill effects of
poverty and its effects on students may be alleviated by the addition of school-
based legal services (SBLS).16 1
SBLS programs typically provide free advice or representation to low-
income families pertaining to civil legal issues, such as housing, public
benefits, consumer protection, domestic violence, and access to special
education.' In addition, some programs incorporate legal education courses,
such as "know your rights" workshops.'67  Similar to medical-legal
partnerships, including these programs within schools makes them more
accessible and easier to navigate.168 SBLS programs help identify legal issues
and provide assistance as needed, which allows schools "to ensure that
students are healthier, safer, and more ready to learn."1 6 9 While there are an
abundance of methods through which lawyers and law students can work
http://www.epi.org/blog/from-ferguson-to-baltimore-the-fruits-of-government-
sponsored-segregation/.
163 Liz Bowie & Erica Green, Bridging the Divide: The struggle to move past
segregated schools, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://data.baltimoresun.com/news/bridging-the-divide/.
" Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of Educ., National Center for Educ. Statistics, Common
Core of Data (analysis by the Maryland Equity Project)).
16' Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School-Based Legal Services as a Tool in
Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline and Achieving Educational Equity, 13
U.MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 212 (2013).
166 Id. at 229.
167 Id.
161 Id. at 230.
169 Id.
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towards a more just Baltimore, SBLS are one avenue for the legal community
to invest into the greater Baltimore community.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement's presence in our schools increased following incidents
like school shootings, however, this interest is not effectively correlated to the
policing efforts currently present. Rather than policing, especially in
consideration of the growing alienation and distrust between the community
and law enforcement, it is crucial to shift our focus to resources that are
consistent with the best interest of the student and school. Youth in Baltimore
City Schools are often coming from violent neighborhoods and have
experienced extensive trauma within their homes and communities. In
addition to shifting the funds dedicated to the BCSPF back into the schools, it
is necessary for the city and state to make racially equitable funding a priority
by investing more resources into our communities facing histories of
injustice.170 The financial costs of policing schools are steep, but more
significantly, the mistreatment of students, harm to the learning climate, and
contribution to the school-to-prison pipeline leads to devastating effects on the
lives of students and their communities.
In order to provide an equal opportunity for social and economic mobility
and to create safe learning environments for all students, as well as cease the
flow into the school-to-prison pipeline, we must eliminate these practices that
continue to unnecessarily push students out of the classroom. General
policing, court involvement, and prosecution should be replaced with holistic
approaches using evidence-based methods, such as restorative justice.
Although many may presume that law enforcement is better suited to address
certain disciplinary issues, treating these concerns as crimes fails to appreciate
the significant and adverse educational and long-term consequences that
result. At the very least, Baltimore youth deserve safe schools and meaningful
educational opportunities. As a city, and a nation, it is necessary to reconsider
the narrative that the presence of law enforcement promotes a safe
environment and implement approaches that are focused on evidence-based
initiatives.
170 See generally, Lawrence Brown, Black Public Schools Need Racially Equitable





NAVIGATING THE GAP IN ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO A CIVIL GIDEON
By: Gregory R. Eyler*
INTRODUCTION
Although falling short of a right to counsel for low-income persons facing
civil issues, or "Civil Gideon"' as it is often called, the availability of legal
assistance through the use of well-trained non-lawyers is a concept rapidly
changing rent escrow and family courtrooms across the country. The New
York Court Navigator Program uses non-lawyers to help unrepresented
litigants in matters including landlord-tenant, debt collection, and small
claims.2 What began as a small pilot project within Brooklyn and the Bronx,
focusing on areas of law surrounding housing, has now successfully
expanded into various additional areas of law including consumer debt.
Likewise, the Washington State Limited License Legal Technician program
allows non-lawyer trained legal technicians to assist unrepresented litigants
in matters regarding family law including divorce and child custody.4 Using
one or both of these programs, which have already shown promise in
successfully assisting low-income pro se litigants at a more reasonable cost
than hiring a lawyer or relying on firms to donate pro bono hours, Maryland
could take a large step towards closing an ever-widening gap' in access to
justice.
* J.D. Graduate, 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank
my faculty advisor, Claudia Diamond, the UB Navigator Project team led by Dr.
Michele Cotton, and the entire staff of University ofBaltimore Law Forum for their
hard work and skillful edits. Lastly, I would like to thank fellow 2018 graduate Tracy
Grisez for introducing me both to the topic and the UB Navigator Project team.
1 Stephen J. Cullen, Kelly A. Powers, The Last Huzzah for Civil Gideon, Md. B.J..
24,26 (November/December 2008).
2 New York State Unified Court System, Court Navigator Program, NYCOURTS.GOV
(last updated Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing/rap.shtml.
' Bold Plans for New York Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/2 1/opinion/bold-plans-for-new-york-courts.html.
4 Gene Johnson, Washington experiments with more affordable legal advice, THE
SEATTLE TIMEs, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-experiments-
with-more-affordable-legal-advice (last updated Sept.2:42PM).
5 See Jed S. Rakoff, Why You Won't Get Your Day in Court, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 24,
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-
court (stating nationally, pro se litigants are twice as likely to lose their home in
foreclosure hearings, and more than 50% less likely to receive a protective order
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Part I of this comment sets the stage for the need of additional resources
for pro se litigants in civil matters, highlighting the rippling effects of the
recession on the legal industry. It describes the programs in New York and
Washington State and how they function in conjunction with the already
established legal system. Part II focuses on the area of landlord-tenant law,
explaining the daunting uphill battle tenants face when dealing with
landlords and the court system. Finally, Part III addresses the feasibility of
these programs in the state of Maryland and the possible next steps that could
further reduce the gap in access to justice in landlord/tenant cases.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Economic Crisis
The economic recession that began in the latter part of 2007 was felt by
every individual and business entity, both in the United States and abroad. In
just two years, from December 2007-2009, the country saw a reduction in
payroll employment by 6.1% as well as total unemployment rates
approaching 10%.6 The number of individuals living below 200% of the
federal poverty line7 increased from roughly 30% to 33% by the end of
2009.'
This overall decrease in economic stability led to record high foreclosure
rates across the country.9 By the end of 2010, 2,871,891 properties had
foreclosing filings.10 With banks foreclosing more properties, the country
after surviving a domestic violence incident); See also Maryland Access to Justice
Commission, http://www.mdaccesstojustice.org (last visited, Feb. 8, 2017) (finding
Maryland meets only 20% of the demand for civil legal services).
6 Economic Policy Institute, The Great Recession, THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA, http://stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/job-loss (last accessed
Nov. 20, 2016).
' See Poverty Guidelines, U S. FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES USED TO
DETERMINE FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN FEDERAL PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND
EVALUATING, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines (calculating 200% of the
federal poverty income level, locate the income level for the desired family
household size and double the value).
8 POV-01. Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and Unrelated Individuals
Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (last
updated Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html#partextimage_30.
9 Nearly 1.1 Million US. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2015, Down 3
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saw its largest leap in rental housing through 2005-2015." During this
period, nine million additional homes were classified as renter households.12
With a larger percentage of individuals and families now renting instead
of purchasing a home, there is a greater number of possible disputes between
landlords and tenants." These additional conflicts result in a larger quantity
of complaints filed during the rentl4 and rent escrow15 docket.16 A survey
conducted by the American Bar Association's ("ABA") coalition for justice
found that judges across the nation believe matters involving disputes
between landlords and tenants are one of the highest growing areas of
litigation. "
The majority of all pro bono hours performed to support low income
individuals are donated by large legal firms." However, the recession
continues to affect all industries, including the legal profession.19 In 2008,
numerous law firm giants were forced to close their doors, reduce or
eliminate bonuses, and implement massive layoffs to offset the loss of
income due to the recession.20 As a result, from 2009 onward, the amount of
" The State of the Nation's Housing 2016, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD OF HARV.
U., (Jun. 22, 2016), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/jchs_2016_state of the nations housing_1owres. pdf (last visited Nov. 20,
2016).
12 Id
13 See Housing, MARYLAND COURTS,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/legalhelp/housing.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2017)
(stating rent court usually involves situation in which a landlord believes the tenant
has not paid rent or has violated the lease, the landlord can take a number of legal
actions).
14 Id.
1 Id. (Rent escrow court usually involves situations in which tenant lives in a
property with certain defects or conditions (usually housing code violations)).
16 Report on the Survey ofJudges on the Impact of the Economic Downturn on
Representation i  the Courts, A.B.A COALITION FOR JUST. (Jul. 12, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/files/Coalition-forJustice__Report on_Survey.pdf at 2
(last visited Nov. 20, 2016).17 Id.
1 Linda Klein, Report on the Survey ofJudges on the Impact of the Economic
Downturn on Representation i the Courts, ABA COALITION FOR JUSTICE (Jul. 12,
2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/files/Coalition-forJusticeReport on_Survey.pdf at 2.
19 Nathan Koppel, Recession Batters Law Firms, Triggering Layoffs, Closings, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123292954232713979 (last
updated Jan. 26, 2009 at 11:59 PM).
20 Id.
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reported pro bono hours to the Pro Bono Institute has dropped by nearly five-
hundred thousand per year.21 Courts nationwide have noted both an increase
in the number of cases filed and in the number of pro se litigants, while the
amount of pro bono hours donated continues to decline.22 As noted by the
judges taking part in the ABA survey, the influx of pro se litigants impedes
judicial economy and harms the litigants' ability to represent themselves.23
The judges believe that when all parties are represented, the system becomes
more just and more efficient.24 In order to achieve a system that optimizes
justness and efficiency, a few complicated questions must be answered. Do
individuals have a right to counsel in regard to civil matters? If the right to
Civil Gideon does exist, who should bear the burden of its cost?
B. Civil Gideon
In its landmark decision, Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the
United States established a constitutional right to counsel in criminal felony
cases.25 Since this decision, numerous organizations, as well as the ABA,
have been advocating for a Civil Gideon, hoping to extend the right of
guaranteed representation to those involved in civil cases.2 6 However, as
time has progressed, the courts have found no such right at either the federal
or state level.27
Because no such right has been found, "[t]here is growing concern among
state judges and legislators about the widespread inability of low income
people to obtain counsel in civil cases."2 8 As early as 2006, the ABA voiced
its concerns by unanimously approving a recommendation stating that:
The American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial
governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public
expense to low income persons in those categories of adversarial
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those
21 Pro Bono Institute, Report on the Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge,
http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/2014-Challenge-Reportl.pdf
at 5 (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
22 See Report on the Survey, supra note 16 at 3.
2 3 Id.
24 Id. at 15.
25 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
26 The Last Huzzah, supra note 1, at 24.
27 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ofDurham Cty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981);
Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 676, 907 A.2d 807, 820 (2006).
28 Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons From Gideon v.
Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 527, 534 (2006).
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involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as
determined by each jurisdiction.29
Although the court system recognizes a problem, it has declared that an
absolute right is not a remedy.30 Acknowledging that a constitutional right to
Civil Gideon is not on the horizon, some states have decided to take matters
into their own hands to address the lack of legal assistance for indigent
individuals.
C. The New York City Navigator Program
The Navigator Program was launched in March of 2014 after gaining the
support of the chief administrative judge of the New York State court system
as well as the presiding justices of the Appellate Division.3 1 The program
uses a volunteer model that provides qualified non-lawyers, labeled
"navigators," who assist unrepresented litigants in mainly consumer credit
and housing matters.32
The navigators are divided into a two-level system.33  The first level
consists of mostly undergraduate student volunteers trained by the Access to
Justice court staff.34 The second level of navigators are comprised of mainly
social and case workers from the non-profit University Settlement.
Regardless of their assigned level, the navigators receive a three-hour
seminar as well as a training manual.36 The training provides a navigator
with information on how a court system works, including an overview of
civil and housing court, along with the basics of consumer debt cases and
29 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, H.D.
Doc. No. 112A, at 1 (2006).
30 The Last Huzzah, supra note 1, at 24.
31 A. Gail Prudenti, Administrative Order of the ChiefAdministrative Judge (Feb. 11,
2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/SSI/pdfs/AO-
4 2-14.pdf (last visited
Dec. 31, 2016).
32 Id
33 Committee on Nonlawyers and the Justice Gap, Navigator Snapshot Report:
December 2014, NEw YORKLA WJOURNAL,
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nonpayment proceedings.37 Not only does the training provide a navigator
with information in regard to the court system, it also helps develop their
interviewing and communication skills in conjunction with learning how to
use the "do-it-yourself' computer programs that the pro se litigants normally
have access to.3 8
The administrative order, establishing the Navigator Program, allows the
navigator to do a variety of tasks both in and out of the courtroom and at all
stages of the pro se litigant's judicial experience.39 The navigator can utilize
their training by informing the unrepresented party about, and assisting in,
the completion of court-designed and court-approved "do-it-yourself' form
documents.40 If the navigator believes that the pro se client may need
additional legal information or the assistance of an attorney, they may assist
the unrepresented party through Law Help.41 If the unrepresented party has
in their possession documents necessary for their trial, a navigator may assist
in the collection and organization of the paperwork to promote judicial
efficiency.42 The navigator may also accompany the unrepresented party
during both hallway negotiations with opposing counsel or conferences with
the judge.43 The navigator is able to provide the unrepresented party with
helpful information including the scheduling of court proceedings as well as
the availability of court services such as interpreters." If the judge allows it,
a navigator is even authorized to answer factual questions posed by the
court.45 The order also establishes a "catch all" of sorts by stating the
navigator may "provide such other non-legal information and perform such
other non-legal services as the court may direct".4 6
Because navigators are not licensed attorneys, they are forbidden from
providing litigants with legal advice, legal representation, or counseling.47
Navigators cannot represent or purport to represent a pro se litigant in court
or during any negotiations.4 8 Navigators may not execute, serve, or file any
documents with the court on behalf of the pro se litigant and may not address
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essence, the navigator must not perform any service that constitutes the
practice of law.5 o
Preliminary results from litigants accompanied by navigators showed
positive results." Of the sixty-one completed questionnaires by litigants who
were accompanied by navigators during the first year of the program, all
agreed that the navigators were helpful, courteous, and understood their
questions.5 2 In addition, fifty-two of the sixty-one strongly agreed that the
navigators were able to answer their questions as well as aid them in
understanding what was occurring in their case.53
The presiding judges in district court on the rent docket during the pilot
program described the navigators as being polite and helpful, especially
noting that there was never a single occurrence of a navigator overstepping
their role or speaking out in the courtroom54 Although the judges noted that
level-two navigators were more effective in their capacity as navigators, they
recognized that litigants being accompanied by level-one navigators seemed
to be less anxious, more relaxed, and better capable to relay the important
facts and details to the judge in charge.
When looking into the data from the Housing Court specifically, a key
distinguishing factor was both the variety and quantity of defenses litigants
raised when they had a navigator assisting thent 56 In a sample of one
hundred cases, fifty where the litigant was pro se and fifty where the litigant
was receiving assistance, the average number of defenses raised were 1.3 and
4.1 respectively.57 In addition, eight of the possible defenses on a list
provided to all litigants by the Housing Court were raised only when the
litigant was receiving assistance by a navigator.
The study concludes that the Navigator Program has shown tangible
benefits to both the judicial system and the litigants it serves to assist.
59 It
notes that with continued support, additional education and training, coupled
with the superior supervision that will surely come as the program ages, the
benefits will continue to grow and expand.' Only time will tell whether
legal assistance based solely on the use of volunteers, many of whom are
undergraduate students, is sufficient to provide quality support and close the
gap of access to justice. Recognizing these issues, Washington State has
50 Id.
" See Committee on Non-lawyers and the Justice Gap, supra note 33.
52 id.
5 Id. at 7.
54 Id. at 9.
5s Id.
56 id
5 See Committee on Nonlawyers and the Justice Gap, supra note 33.
" Id. at 11-12.
59 Id. at 12.
60 Id.
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developed a program that goes a step further than volunteerism and
incorporates a formal licensed career aimed at making access to justice more
affordable.
D. The Washington State Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLT)
Program
Unlike the volunteer based system of New York, the Washington State
LLLT program allows individuals to become licensed to assist litigants in
certain areas of law for a fee.61 To become licensed,62 an individual must (1)
pass an examination, (2) acquire 3,000 hours of substantive law-related work
under the direct supervision of a licensed lawyer, (3) pay an annual license
fee, and (4) be capable of proving their ability to respond to damages
resulting from their acts or omissions during their services.
Much like a navigator, an LLLT may assist the litigant with self-help
materials, obtain relevant facts, and assist the litigant in organizing
documents; however, an LLLT can go much further in scope of assistance by
explaining the relevancy of the facts, documents, and proceedings to the
litigant." In addition, the LLLT can perform legal research for the litigant as
well as draft legal documents and letters with the caveat that they be
reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Washington State chose to focus its program around "Domestic
Relations," thereby allowing LLLTs to render legal services in regard to (1)
child support modification actions, (2) dissolution actions, (3) some domestic
violence actions, (4) legal separation actions, (5) pre-approved parenting plan
modifications, (6) parenting and support actions, (7) paternity actions, and
(8) some relocation actions.66 Recognizing that a growing number of low-
income individuals were requiring the service of pro bono attorneys and that
family law lawyers were needed for the lion's share of pro bono work, the
Supreme Court of Washington State sought to create a program that
alleviated the stress of all parties involved.67
In March of 2017, the National Center for State Courts and the American
Bar Foundation released their preliminary evaluation of the Washington








67 APR28.Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, 2 Wash.
Prac., Rules Practice APR 28 (7th ed., 2017).
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State Limited License Legal Technician Program." The evaluation
concluded that clients found the LLLTs provided competent assistance and
reduced their clients' overall stress, fear, and confusion throughout the
process.69  Further, the clients that utilized the services of the LLLTs
believed their legal outcome was improved.0
However, the success has come at a price, as both the regulatory and law
school business models require significant subsidies to continue operation.n
With the limited availability of enrollment, the fees generated by LLLTs do
not currently provide enough revenue to cover the overall costs.
7 2  The
authors concluded their evaluation by stating the LLLT program is "an
innovative way to extend affordable legal services to a potentially large
segment of the public that cannot afford traditional lawyers," and encouraged
the program to be replicated in other states as a means to improve access to
-73justice.
II. MARYLAND'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE ISSUES
Nearly one million potential pro bono cases nationally are turned away by
organizations every year due to a lack of funding.74 The 2015 census data
found 13.5% of Americans were below the federal poverty line.75 In
Maryland, that number was slightly smaller at 9.7%.76 However, Maryland's
68 Thomas M. Clarke & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Preliminary Evaluation of the










74 Legal Services Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America, LEGAL SERV.
CORP. (Sept. 2009),
http://www.1sc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting-the-justicegap-in-am
erica 2009.pdf ("Data was collected only from LSC-funded programs. The count
does not include people who may have sought help unsuccessfully from other
programs. This limitation is particularly significant in a few states and grantee
service areas where intake is not primarily performed by the LSC grantees, which
could consequently count only a small percentage of the total number of persons
who were turned down for service").
" Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.html).
76 QuickFacts Baltimore, City, Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
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more urban areas, such as Baltimore City, had a staggering average poverty
rate of 23.7%.77 Maryland, for 2015, had a 33.2% rate of occupation from
renters for all occupied housing units.7 ' Maryland renters faced a median
gross rent79 of $1,230 per month.80 For 42% of these rental households, over
35% of their income is spent towards paying rental costs.81 However, when a
tenant is forced into rent court for failing to pay rent, the tenant faces a
difficult decision of either representing themselves or somehow affording an
ever rising attorney fee. 82
A. Tension Between the Landlords and Tenants
The State of Maryland has taken actions to ensure that landlords repair
and eliminate conditions and defects that constitute, or will constitute if not
promptly corrected, a serious and substantial threat to the life, health, or
safety of occupants.8 3 If such a condition exists, § 8-211 of the Maryland
Property Code provides steps the tenant must take to ensure a legal remedy
be available.84 First, the tenant must put the landlord on notice by way of (1)
written communication through certified mail listing the conditions or
defects, (2) through actual notice of the conditions or defects, or (3) through
a notice provided by an appropriate governmental body. From the time in
which the landlord receives their notice, they have a reasonable time in
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/IPE120215/2404000,24 (last visited Jan. 04,
2016).
n Id.
' American Fact Finder, DPO4: Selected Housing Characteristics 2011-2015
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. (Select "Advanced
Search, then type "DP04: Selected Housing Characteristics: 2012" in the topic
name then type "Maryland" under State, then click "Go", select "Show Table').
79 "Median Gross Rent, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/HSG860216 (last visited Feb. 22,
2018) ("The U.S. Census Bureau defines gross rent as the contract rent plus the
estimated average monthly cost of utilities (electricity, gas, and water and sewer) and
fuels (oil, coal, kerosene, wood, etc.) if these are paid by the renter (or paid for the
renter by someone else). Gross rent is intended to eliminate differentials that result
from varying practices with respect to the inclusion of utilities and fuels as part of
the rental payment. The estimated costs of water and sewer, and fuels are reported on
a 12-month basis but are converted to monthly figures for the tabulations").
80 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 8.
8 AMERICAN FACT FINDER, supra note 79.
82 J. Rakoff, supra note 5.
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which to correct, if true, the asserted conditions or defects.86 Although the
landlord has a reasonable amount of time, it is noted that anything in excess
of thirty days has a rebuttable presumption to be unreasonable.87 Lastly,
either affirmatively or defensively, after the above two elements have been
met, a tenant may finally bring action of rent escrow.88
The largest problem with the procedure outlined above is that tenants,
especially those with low income, are simply uninformed of their rights and
defenses.89 Without a representative to assist a tenant in finding or
understanding all of the defenses available to them, many tenants are
unaware that they can defend themselves against eviction.9 Both tenants
and landlords are permitted to have non-lawyer representation in court.91
Whereas the landlord's representation is not restricted, a tenant's non-lawyer
must be (1) a law student practicing in a clinical law program at an
accredited law school with the in-court supervision of a faculty member, or
(2) an employee of certain types of non-profit organizations who has training
and is supervised by a lawyer.9 2
This results in most landlords being able to be represented by property
agents.93  Landlords therefore can have a non-lawyer representative that
usually is more economical than retaining a lawyer and still obtain beneficial
knowledge and experience of rent and rent escrow court procedures.9 4




89 See generally Michael Ricciardelli, Research Shows Tenants Don't Know Their
Rights, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY (Oct. 2016),
https://www.shu.edu/news/researchshows-tenants-dont-know-rights.cfin (Authors of
study found that of 40,000 cases, only 80 (.2%) of tenants asserted a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability).
90 Jean Marbella, Legal Aid: Despite Errors in Complaints, Landlords Win Rent
Cases, WWW.BALTIMORESUN.COM (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-evictions-legal-aid-20160920-
story.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
9' MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-206 (West 2017).
92 Id.
9 See generally Rent Escrow: When the Landlord Fails to Make Repairs, THE
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All of the individuals and families behind these statistics deserve and are
constitutionally mandated the right to due process.95 This includes both
timely and adequate notice prior to an action proceeding against the party in
court and an opportunity to be heard.96 Maryland has taken steps to protect
the right to secure housing by preventing the use of self-help evictions in
rental housing as well as requiring that landlords obtain a warrant issued by a
court that can only be executed by a sheriff or constable prior to eviction.97
As Justice Thurgood Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States
wrote,
A landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved
with due process of law unless both parties have had a fair
opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were never intended to
serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants,
but rather to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his
home.98
Therefore, it falls upon the courts to ensure that every tenant is given their
due process and a fair trial before being evicted from their dwelling.
However, according to a Maryland Legal Aid study released in 2016,
172,635 failure to pay rent ("FTPR") cases in 2012 had at least one type of
error.99 Using a sample of 1,380 FTPR cases from all twelve of Maryland's
judicial districts, researchers analyzed the complaint and audio recordings for
each case." The largest issue, representing at least 17.5% of the cases, was
that an incorrect outcome, based on current Maryland law, occurred.'01 The
report found that in 15.5% of complaints, the landlord failed to satisfy at
least one of the legal obligations required in order to make a basic case for
judgment and eviction.102 One such requirement was the use of a proper
complaint form.10 3 In May of 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided
McDaniel v. Baranowski, where the court held that landlords who fail to
95 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1020, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287
(1970).
96 Id.
97 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-216 (West 2013).
98 Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385, 94 S. Ct. 1723, 1734, 40 L. Ed. 2d
198 (1974).
99 Maryland Legal Aid, Human Rights in Maryland's Rent Courts: A Statistical
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possess a current license to operate the premises as mandated by county code
are not entitled to utilize the summary ejectment procedures of the court."
The Legal Aid study found that despite the ruling in McDaniel, outdated
failure to pay rent forms that omitted inquiry into whether the landlords had
valid licenses were accepted and used to evict tenants.105
Furthermore, the judges failed to determine if the landlord met their
burden of proof and if the legal requirements to obtain a judgment were
met.10 These inactions led to 95,275 deficient complaints that still resulted
in default judgments against the tenants.107  In addition to insufficient
complaints, the study found that in 8.5% of cases, the tenant was not
provided with adequate notice of legal claims or given an opportunity to be
heard, stripping them of their right to due process.108 Despite the lack of
proper notice, 52,232 default judgments were still entered against these
tenants. 1
C. Societal Costs
When families lose their homes, they also often lose their sense of self-
worth and dignity. Unfortunately, being homeless also leaves individuals
more susceptible to mental health issues due to stress, communicable
diseases from shared living spaces and shelters, malnutrition, weather
exposure, and violence.110 However, it is not just the adults who suffer;
children who become homeless are more likely to develop a learning
disability, have to repeat a grade, or be suspended from school."' Homeless
children are also more susceptible to experiencing hunger which can lead to
reduced physical, social, emotional, and cognitive development.112
Homelessness also often has negative economic costs that the community
must bear.1 13 The number of homeless people is on the rise; a sampling
104 McDaniel, 419 Md. 560, 563, 19 A.3d 927, 929 (2011).




"Homelessness & Health: What's the Connection? NAT'L HEALTH CARE FOR THE
HOMELESS COUNCIL (June 2011), http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/09/Hln_healthfactsheetCJanl 0.pdf.
.' Effects of Poverty, Hunger and Homelessness on Children and Youth, AMERICAN
PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/pi/families/poverty.aspx.
112Id
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taken in Baltimore City in 2015 placed the number of unsheltered individuals
up 14% from 2013 counts.114 In addition, the number of sheltered persons
also increased by 5% since 2013.115
III. SOLUTION
A. Adoption of a Navigator Program Pilot in Baltimore City
Given the issues surrounding Maryland's rent and rent escrow courts, not
only would an adoption of a Navigator Program benefit judicial efficiency,
but it would also increase the protection of rights for tenants facing
eviction.116 Using the New York program as a guide, Maryland has access to
an already vetted and highly praised framework to incorporate into a pilot
program.117 Taking into consideration Baltimore City's relatively high rate
of renters in low-income situations"' in conjunction with its geographical
proximity to both of the accredited law schools within the state, it would
serve as an ideal location for a pilot."'9
Maryland navigators could assist individuals by informing litigants about
free legal assistance for which they may be eligible, as well as assisting in
the utilization of self-help assistance and materials both provided by the
court system and available online.120  They could also be proactive by
gathering information about the litigant's situation, and if the situation
warrants such action, suggesting the litigant seek advice or representation
from a pro bono attorney.12 1
Before a proceeding, a navigator may provide scripted definitions of court
processes including the general remedies and defenses available to persons in
rent and rent escrow court. A navigator may also define the elements that
114 Baltimore City: 2015 Point-in-Time Count & Housing Inventory Count Results,




116 See Committee on Nonlawyers and the Justice Gap, supra note 33.
117 Victor Li, Use of nonlawyers to help litigants navigate NYC housing court has
been a success, ABF study finds, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 2016),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/use ofnon-
lawyers-to helplitigants-navigate-nyc-housing-court hasbeen_a_.
118 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 76.
"' Both the University of Baltimore School of Law and the University of Maryland
School of Law reside within Baltimore City limits.
120 Memorandum from University of Baltimore Working Group on Legal Assistance
Alternatives on Navigator Pilot Project (April 2, 2017) (on file with author).
121 Id.
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must be shown to successfully argue each defense, and assist the litigant with
the completion of court petitions or other court provided forms.122
The navigator will provide general descriptions of the roles of the clerks,
judges, housing inspectors, landlord, and landlord agents if applicable and
inform the litigant generally of common issues that arise during court and
how they are typically handled.12 3 The navigator will accompany the litigant
during proceedings by assisting with the organization and submission of any
document requested by the judge, including note taking, and if needed,
further accompany the litigant during any hallway negotiations with
opposing attorney, landlord, or landlord representative.12 4
Most importantly, the navigator shall ensure understanding of and
compliance with any court order or settlement agreement. This could include
providing information as to follow-up steps, including reinsertion, how to
restore the case to the court calendar by motion, and reminding the litigant of
any future court date.125
Much like the New York program, there will be precautions put in place
to ensure that a navigator's actions do not cross the threshold into legal
advice.126 With that in mind, a navigator under the Maryland program would
be prohibited from (1) providing professional advice about one's legal
situation, (2) suggesting a course of action based on an interpretation of the
law, (3) directly representing the litigant, (4) discussing or assisting the
litigant with legal matters unrelated to rent or rent escrow cases, (5) charging
or collecting a fee or gift in exchange for services.127
i. Implementation of the Navigator Program
A pilot program similar to the New York Navigator Program has already
garnered favor in the Maryland Judiciary.12 8 The recommendation calls for
an evaluation period to determine the potential applicability of the program
with state wide implementation being the ultimate goal. 129
The program is currently staffed by twenty-five students of the University
of Baltimore's undergraduate and graduate schools. Recalling the criticisms
of the New York program in regard to training, the Baltimore program





126 Memorandum from University of Baltimore Working Group on Legal Assistance
Alternatives on Navigator Pilot, supra note 121.
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participants of the Baltimore Navigator pilot are required to watch a series of
informational online lessons that highlight ypical scenarios they would
encounter in rent and rent escrow court, and are further required to pass a
comprehension quiz following each lesson. Only when the participant has
successfully completed each video and accompanying quiz are they allowed
to move on to the next step in their training.
The successful navigators-to-be then spend a half-day in the courthouse
for orientation and observation of the rent and rent escrow docket. Utilizing
their knowledge gained from the previous phase of training, the students then
gain an understanding of how they as navigators can assist the pro se litigant
and have the opportunity to see how the legal process works first-hand.
The final training implementation will require the hopeful navigator to
participate in a supervised simulation, including role-playing, so that they
can incorporate the information they have acquired both from the video
lessons and their observations of court proceedings before assisting their very
first renter.
The working group has been successfully operating since the 2017 fall
semester. With the assistance of the self-help center run by the Legal Aid
Bureau and offices run by Public Justice Center, the navigator will be able to
assist pro se litigants already present at the courthouse and refer more
complex situations to the Pro Bono Resource Center of Maryland.
B. Possible Expansion into an LLLT Program
Maryland would be in a prime position while implementing the Navigator
pilot to monitor the progress of the LLLT program in Washington State. Not
only would the program create an additional source of revenue for
individuals who would seek technician licenses, but the fees collected and
resulting economic boost that goes with job creation could benefit the
community in which the technicians serve. Other potential benefits would be
realized in increased revenues for Maryland law schools that choose to offer
the program. Many law schools are struggling and only beginning to recover
from the ripples of the economic recession and an additional source of
students could be very beneficial to these institutions. 130
C. Possible Criticisms of the Navigator and LLLT Programs
130 Mark Hansen, As law school enrollment drops, experts disagree on whether the
bottom is in sight, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aslawschoolenrollmentdropsexpe
rtsdisagree on whetherthe bottom (After peaking in 2010, ABA accredited law
schools faced four years straight of decreased enrollment).
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One of the largest issues opponents of non-lawyer service programs have
is a charge of unauthorized practice of law. 13 1 However, it is often hard to
define what the practice of law actually entails.132 Through the years, it has
been described rather circularly, 133 overbroad,134 or far too narrow,135 as to
include tasks that non-lawyer individuals have been permitted to perform for
years. This comment does not take the position that the goals the regulation
surrounding unauthorized practice of law strives to maintain are invalid, but
rather outdated.
When reviewing the intent of the governing language, the reader must
remember that the regulation is intended to benefit the public. 136 Prohibitions
should be reasonable to increase access to justice and protect the
consumer.13 7  Regulation does not need to be a zero sum game; an
intermediate category of tasks that was originally handled exclusively by
barred attorneys can be opened to skilled and educated non-lawyers.138 With
a greater access to higher education, individuals may be better equipped to
provide informational services than they were when the rules were originally
developed.13 9 With the rapid advancements of technology, software can be
developed that allows for easier completion of court forms and other data-
entry-focused documents, that a non-lawyer could assist a pro se litigant with
13' See Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn.
1988) (finding that the practice of law is what lawyers do every day in their
practice).
132 Id.
134 ABA, Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice ofLaw Report 4
(2003),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional-responsib
ility/modeldef migrated/taskforcerpt_803 (holding that the "definition should
include the basic premise that the practice of law is the application of legal principles
and judgment to the circumstances or objectives of another person or entity").
135 ABA, Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice ofLaw: Definition of
the Practice of Law Draft (Sept. 2002),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/task force model d
efinition_practicelaw/modeldefinition definition.html (holding that "drafting...
legal documents or agreements that affect the legal rights of a person" constitutes the
practice of law, a task that non-lawyers in most jurisdictions are capable of doing).
13' Richard Zorza, David Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to
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filing. 140 Lastly, because the concerns and incentives are dissimilar in non-
profit settings compared to for-profit, regulation of non-lawyers may be less
restrictive in the area.141
One of the largest concerns for any project can always be boiled down to
funding. Initially, a Maryland navigator pilot would rely on already existing
structural support from organizations such as Legal Aid and Public Justice
Center. In regard to supplying the human element, the program, like that of
New York, would rely on volunteers from the educational and legal
community.
If a successful LLLT program was to be instated in Maryland, part of the
fees paid for license upkeep could also be earmarked to assist the navigator
program in the result of expansion or other access to justice programs. The
navigator program should not compete with already existing pro bono
organizations for public funding.
Opponents of the program fear competition for licensed attorneys in the
fields that the LLLT program will be operating in. However, the clientele
that the LLLT seeks to service are those with low to moderate income that
cannot afford the services of a lawyer to begin with.14 2 Others believe that
the LLLT program will produce incompetent technicians incapable of
handling the complexity of legal matters without the supervision of an
attorney, resulting in poor quality work and harm to the consumers.14 3
Proponents of the program are quick to point out that in the field of
medicine, another highly specialized area of study involving complexity, the
nurse-practitioner successfully operates in a market full of doctors.'" Many
believe that the legal field is in need of a nurse-practitioner ole. 145
CONCLUSION
Although there usually are no perfect solutions to societal problems, it is
time for states to begin innovating ways to increase access to justice. As far
back as 1992, Maryland has been considering the feasibility of implementing
some form of non-lawyer performed limited legal services in the areas of
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Robert Ambrogi, Washington state moves around UPL, using legal technicians to
help close the justice gap, WWW.ABAJOURNAL.COM (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/washington state-moves-around.upl
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bankruptcy, family law, and landlord/tenant disputes.14
6 By adopting one or
both programs, the state would reaffirm Maryland's commitment to its
citizens in reducing the justice gap seen across the nation and improving the
lives of many low-income residents faced with civil litigation. Maryland has
an opportunity to be in the forefront of the Mid-Atlantic region and pioneer
its own version, a potentially better version, of a navigator program that can
increase judicial efficiency, protect the due process rights of its litigants, and
reduce the societal costs of homelessness. The only question remaining is
whether Maryland will accept the challenge and join Washington State and
New York and lead the nation in closing the gap in access to justice.
146 Sands McKinley, Legal Technicians Across the US, www.sandsmckinley.com
(Jun. 05, 2015), http://www.sandsmckinley.com/legal-technicians-across-the-us/
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CECCONE V. CARROLL HOME SER VICES, LLC: A
CONTRACT PROVISION SHORTENING THE PERIOD TO
FILE AN ACTION MAY BE PERMISSIBLE UNLESS THERE
IS A STATUTE TO THE CONTRARY, CERTAIN DEFENSES
ARE ESTABLISHED, OR THE PROVISION IS
UNREASONABLE.
By: Molly Miller
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a contractual provision
shortening the statutory time limit for filing suit is enforceable as long as
there is not a statute to the contrary, the provision is not the result of fraud,
duress, or misrepresentation, and the provision is reasonable, under the
circumstances. Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC, 454 Md. 680, 698,
165 A.3d 475, 485 (2017). The court further held that the trial court erred in
finding the contract provision enforceable because it did not consider
whether defenses such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation applied. Id.
Richard and Daphne Ceccone ("Ceccones") entered into a maintenance
contract with Carroll Home Services, LLC ("CHS") for their oil-fueled
furnace. Section 10 of the agreement established that any legal action
regarding the contract must be brought within one year, or the claim will be
barred as a matter of law. However, Section 9 permitted CHS to delay in
enforcing any of their rights, effectively creating a one-sided shortened
statute of limitations.
In April of 2014, the Ceccones' home was damaged due to an incident
with their furnace. They consulted with an engineer, an insurance adjuster,
and another furnace company, all of whom found CHS at fault for the
incident. The Ceccones attempted to negotiate for damages in 2015, but
ultimately the parties failed to reach a resolution.
On December 24, 2015, the Ceccones filed suit against CHS in the
District Court for Anne Arundel County, claiming breach of contract and
fraud. On January 19, 2016 CHS responded with an intent to defend. The
district court dismissed the case based on the shortened limitations clause in
the contract since the action was filed more than a year after the incident.
The Ceccones appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The
circuit court also found in favor of CHS based on the shortened limitations
clause. The Ceccones appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The case
was then transferred to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, who granted
certiorari, since it involved an issue of law that was best resolved by the
higher court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
rationale behind statutes of limitations. The court noted that these statutes
are designed to balance the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the public.
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Ceccone, 454 Md. at 691, 165 A.3d at 481. The limitation represents a
policy decision setting a reasonable time for the plaintiff to investigate and
file suit, while protecting the defendant from a claim that has been
unreasonably delayed. Id. (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433,
437-38, 550 A.2d 1155 (1988); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296
Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983)). The three-year statute of limitations
governing the Ceccones' claim illustrates a policy decision determining three
years as an adequate amount of time for a reasonably diligent plaintiff to
bring suit. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 691, 165 A.3d at 481 (citing Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101).
The court continued by stating that statutes of limitations are not an
absolute limit. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692, 165 A.3d at 481-82. Limitation
periods are frequently lengthened by waiving or tolling, and in some cases
shortened through consent. Id. The court identified approaches taken by
other states, including enacting statutes to prohibit these types of provisions
or judicially prohibiting these provisions in the name of public policy. Id. at
692-93, 165 A.3d at 482. Some states permit these provisions absent
defenses regarding the contract's formation. Id. Furthermore, certain
jurisdictions will simply permit the provision after evaluating its
reasonableness. Id.
Next, the court explained how Maryland law has combined these
approaches. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 693, 165 A.3d at 482. Specifically, for
insurance and surety contracts, the Maryland legislature has expressly
prohibited shortening the statute of limitations. Id. at 693, 165 A.3d at 482
(citing Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 12-104 (West); St. Paul Travelers v. Millstone,
412 Md. 424, 987 A.2d 116 (2010)). Overall, however, Maryland follows a
three-part test to determine if the provision is permissible. Ceccone, at 693-
94, 165 A.3d at 482-833 (citing College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Inc. v.
Morabito Consultants, Inc., 132 Md. App. 158, 174, 752 A.2d 265 (2000)).
Under this the test the provision will be found permissible if there is no
statute to the contrary, the provision is reasonable, and the limitation is not
subject to defenses of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. Id.
In analyzing the first element, the court found no Maryland statute barring
a provision that shortened the period to file an action regarding a home
services maintenance agreement. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 696, 165 A.3d at 484
(citing Morabito, 132 Md. App. 158, 752 A.2d 265). The court then
addressed defenses to contract formation and stated that the Ceccones'
defenses of alleged misrepresentation and fraud were not evaluated by the
circuit court. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 696, 165 A.3d at 484. The circuit court
initially stated that the Ceccones were bound by the agreement regardless of
the circumstances, which was in opposition to the judicial standard requiring
consideration of certain defenses. Id.
The court next addressed the reasonableness of the provision.
Reasonableness is measured by reviewing factors including the subject
matter of the contract, the difference in length between the statutory
limitation and contractually established limitation, the bargaining power of
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the parties, and whether the provision is one-sided. Ceccone, 454 Md. at
694-95, 165 A.3d at 483 (citing Morabito, 132 Md. App. 158, 752 A.2d
265). When the Ceccones raised the issue of reasonableness, the circuit
court refused to consider the issue since it had seen limitation periods in
similar agreements. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 696-97, 165 A.3d at 484.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland ultimately remanded the case, with
specific instructions for the circuit court to consider the evidence of
misrepresentation and fraud, and to determine whether this evidence
undermined the validity of the shortened limitations period. Ceccone, 454
Md. at 697, 165 A.3d at 485. Further, they instructed the circuit court to
determine if the shortened period was reasonable. Id. In making this
determination the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and
apply the following factors: the length of the shortened limitations period, its
relation to the statutorily established limitations period, the bargaining power
of the parties, the subject matter of the agreement, whether the provision is
one-sided, and other facets of the limitation provision. Id. at 697-98, 165
A.3d at 485.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has for the first time adopted this
three-part test, previously utilized by the court of special appeals. Its holding
requires courts to apply the correct judicially-established test for limitation
provisions in contracts of this nature. Practitioners that utilize limitation-
shortening provisions in their contracts will be forced to comply with this
new test. They must also ensure the provision is reasonable, utilizing the
factors explained by the court in the instant case. This will likely adjust how
attorneys write contracts, in order to ensure compliance with the court's
holding. Further, this decision may provide a defense for litigants bound by
shortened limitation periods in contractual clauses. They will now be able to




DOE V. ALTERNATIVE MED. MD., LLC: GROWERS OF
MEDICAL CANNABIS WERE ENTITLED TO INTERVENE IN
AN ACTION REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF GROWERS'
LICENSES BECAUSE THEIR MOTION WAS TIMELY AND
THEY SHOWED AN IMPEDIMENT TO AN INTEREST THAT
WAS NOT ALREADY ADEQUATLY REPRESENTED.
By: Marrio B. Davis
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that certain pre-approved medical
cannabis growers were entitled to intervention as of right under Maryland
Rule § 2-214 ("Md. Rule § 2-214"). Doe v. Alternative Med. Md., LLC, 455
Md. 377, 168 A.3d 21 (2017). In compliance with Md. Rule § 2-214, the
growers' motion to intervene was timely, they had a clear interest in the case
not represented by the current parties, and they demonstrated an impediment
to that interest. Id. The court further held that the growers were entitled to
intervention under section 3-405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings of
the Maryland Code ("CJ §3-405"). Id. However, the court affirmed the
lower court's denial of the trade associations' and patients' motion for
intervention. Id.
The Maryland General Assembly created the Natalie M. LaPrade Medical
Cannabis Commission ("Commission") in 2013 to facilitate pre-approvals
and licensing procedures for medical cannabis growers in Maryland. In
August of 2016, the Commission pre-approved the top fifteen applications
for medical cannabis grower licenses. Alternative Medicine Maryland, LLC
("AMM"), an African-American owned business, was not one of the
applicants selected for a grower license.
AMM filed a complaint alleging that the Commission violated section 13-
3306 of the Maryland Heath Code ("HG § 13-3306") by failing to consider
racial and ethnic diversity in their pre-approval process for medical cannabis
grower licenses. AMM additionally sought an order to prohibit the
Commission from issuing final approvals on the fifteen pre-approved grower
licenses until the Commission complied with HG §13-3306. The court
ultimately granted AMM's request for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
The Commission filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the pre-approved
growers were necessary parties which AMM failed to include as defendants.
Later, several businesses with pre-approved licenses and patients filed
motions to intervene. These parties contended that they had a direct interest
in the action which would be prejudiced by any delay. The circuit court
denied the motions to intervene and consequently, the motion to dismiss,
concluding that the interveners had not met their burden of showing
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intervention as of right. The growers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
and a motion to stay the circuit court proceedings, which were granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first examined whether the circuit
court erred in denying the growers' motion to intervene. Doe, 455 Md. at
419, 168 A.3d at 46. For intervention to be granted as of right the motion
must meet the following requirements: timeliness, party must claim an
interest related to the subject of the action, the disposition of the action must
impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, and the interest
is not already adequately represented by existing parties. Id. at 415, 168
A.3d at 44 (citing Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2)).
In applying these requirements, the court examined four factors in its
determination of timeliness. Doe, 455 Md. at 420, 168 A.3d at 47. These
factors included the purpose for which the intervention was sought, the
probability of prejudice to the parties, the progression of the proceedings,
and the reasons for delaying intervention. Id. (citing Md. -Nat '1 Capital Park
& Planning Comm'n v. Town of Washington Grove, 408 Md. 37, 70, 968
A.2d 552, 572 (2009)). Applying these factors, the court found that the
growers sought to intervene to protect their medical marijuana companies
which constituted a valid property interest. Doe, 455 Md. at 420, 168 A.3d
at 47. The interest in their companies would have been impeded by AMM's
requested order to withhold final approvals of their licenses. Id.
Furthermore, the motion to intervene was only filed two months after
AMM's complaint and AMM never raised the issue of untimeliness. Id.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the motion was filed in the appropriate
time and there was no delay in seeking intervention. Id.
The court continued to analyze intervention as of right by examining the
remaining requirements. Doe, 455 Md. at 415, 168 A.3d at 44. The growers
were required to show an interest essential to the case and not otherwise
protected by the existing parties. Id. Additionally, intervening parties are
required to establish that the disposition of the action would potentially
impair their ability to protect that interest. Id. at 416, 168 A.3d at 44 (citing
Washington Grove, 408 Md. at 99, 968 A.2d at 590). Thus, the growers
must demonstrate that they will be disadvantaged in some way by the case's
disposition. Doe, 455 Md. at 416, 168 A.3d at 44 (citing Bd. of Trs. Of
Emps.' Ret. Sys. of City of Balt. V Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 317
Md. 72, 89 n. 19, 562 A.2d 720, 728 n.19 (1989)).
The court found the growers had a valid interest because they had already
begun hiring employees and contracting facilities to meet the state's
regulatory deadlines. Doe, 455 Md. at 421, 168 A.3d at 47. Costs
accumulated in anticipation of future business created a financial burden on
the growers. Id. Further, the court noted that because of the growers' pre-
approved status, they could be clearly disadvantaged since the disposition
could impact their current status in the licensing process. Id. at 422, 168
A.3d at 48. Therefore, the court concluded that exclusion of the growers as
parties would impede the growers' ability to protect their interests in the
licensing process. Id. at 423, 168 A.3d at 48.
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The court also found that the growers met the fourth requirement of
inadequate representation. Doe, 455 Md. at 423, 168 A.3d at 49. This
requires a comparison between the interests of the party seeking intervention
and those of the current parties. Id. at 417, 168 A.3d at 45 (citing
Washington Grove, 408 Md. at 102, 968 A.2d at 591). The court determined
that as competitors in the medical cannabis industry, the growers and AMM
had adverse interests. Doe, 455 Md. at 423, 168 A.3d at 49. Similarly, the
Commission also could not adequately represent the growers since their
interest was to license qualified growers, not to favor a particular grower
over another. Id. Therefore, the court found it impossible for AMM or the
Commission to adequately represent the growers' interests. Id. Having met
all the requirements of Md. Rule 2-214(a)(2), the growers were entitled to
intervene as of right. Id.
Next, the court moved to the issue of intervention as of right for the trade
association and select patients. Doe, 455 Md. at 430, 168 A.3d at 53. The
patients claimed a future interest since qualifying physicians may prescribe
them medical cannabis for their illnesses. Id. Additionally, the trade
association claimed an interest because of their advocacy for access to
medical cannabis. Id. The court found these interests too generalized and
not adequately related to the subject of the action. Id.
Although the trade associations' and patients' interests could be harmed,
the court could not determine with any degree of certainty that the outcome
of the suit would cause specialized damage different than that of the general
public. Doe, 455 Md. at 431, 168 A.3d at 53. The court also found that the
trade associations' and patients' interests could not be impaired or impeded
because the disposition of the case would not prevent medical cannabis from
becoming available in Maryland. Id. at 431, 168 A.3d at 54. Ultimately, the
court found the interests of the trade associations and patients too attenuated
to satisfy Md. Rule 2-214. Id. at 430, 168 A.3d at 53.
Finally, the court examined intervention claims brought in cases of
declaratory judgment. Doe, 455 Md. at 419, 168 A.3d at 46. Id. CJ § 3-405
provides an independent basis for intervention separate from Md. Rule § 2-
214 when declaratory judgment is at issue. Id. at 428-29, 168 A.3d at 51-2.
The court noted that CJ § 3-405 applies specifically to declaratory judgment
actions. Id. However, similar to Md. Rule §2-214, the movant needs to
show an interest affected by the decision. Id. Therefore, the growers
satisfied CJ § 3-405 by demonstrating a valid property interest that would be
affected by the court's granting of AMM's order prohibiting the growers
license approvals. Id. at 430, 168 A.3d at 53.
Ultimately, The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the growers
were entitled to intervention as of right and remanded the case for further
proceedings. However, the trade associations and patients were not entitled
to intervention. This case clarifies the court of appeal's distinction between
interventions under CJ § 4-305 and Md. Rule § 2-214. Parties must only
demonstrate an interest in the case that could be impeded by the disposition.
The threshold for motions to intervene is rather low and should continue to
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allow interested parties to intervene without much issue. Further, the case
demonstrates the many parties with interests pertaining to the medical
cannabis industry. Allowing these parties to intervene will keep the industry
balanced and non-discriminatory.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
GREEN V. STATE: THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED TO
DISCLOSE A WITNESS'S PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION OF
A CO-DEFENDANT; A MANDATORY DISCLOSURE EXISTS
WHEN A STATE WITNESS'S PRETRIAL IDENTIFCATION
OF A CO-DEFENDANT IS DEEMED RELEVANT MATERIAL
OR INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRETRIAL
IDENTIFCATION OF THE DEFENDANT.
By: Taylor Koncen
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the plain language of
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) ("Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)") does not require
the State to disclose a witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant.
Green v. State, 456 Md. 97, 141, 171 A.3d 1162, 1187 (2017). The court
also held that in circumstances where the witness's pretrial identification of a
co-defendant is equivalent to an identification of the defendant, disclosure by
the State is required because that identification is relevant information under
Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Id. at 161-62, 171 A.3d at 1199. Finally, the court
held that the State's failure to disclose this identification was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 168, 171 A.3d at 1202.
John W. Green ("Green") and Jonathan Copeland ("Copeland")
confronted Jeffrey Myers ("Myers") after Copeland's home was burglarized.
During the confrontation, Myers was fatally shot. Green, Copeland, and
Myers were the only individuals present at the scene of the shooting. Green
and Copeland were arrested and charged with first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and other related charges.
Copeland pled guilty to first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder. At trial, the State presented testimony of its sole
eyewitness, Doris Carter ("Carter"). Carter provided a description of the two
men that confronted Myers. She also identified Copeland, in the courtroom,
as the man who did not shoot Myers. Following the State's proffer of
Carter's testimony, Green objected, arguing that the State failed to disclose
Carter's identification of Copeland prior to trial. The Circuit Court for Cecil
County over-ruled Green's objection and allowed Carter to identify
Copeland as the individual who did not shoot Myers. Green was convicted
of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Green
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the
circuit court's decision, holding that the language of Md. Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) was unambiguous and did not impose an obligation upon the
State to disclose Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Green's petition for a writ of
certiorari to decide two issues. The first issue presented was whether the
language of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose a
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witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant. The court was also asked
to consider the Court of Special Appeals' holding that Carter's identification
of Copeland was not relevant material or information regarding the pretrial
identification of Green. Green, 456 Md. at 121, 171 A.3d at 1175-76.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
language of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Green, 456 Md. at 121, 171 A.3d at
1176. The rule mandates the State to disclose all relevant material or
information regarding a witness's pretrial identification of the defendant. Id.
In the present case, the court held that the language of Md. Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) was plain, unambiguous, and did not require the disclosure of a
State witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant. Id. at 147, 171 A.3d
at 1190.
Next, the court discussed whether the State was required to disclose
Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland as relevant information to the
identification of Green under the scope of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Green,
456 Md. at 147, 171 A.3d at 1190-91. Green argued that Carter's pretrial
identification of Copeland constituted relevant information since it identified
him as the shooter, and thus required disclosure. Id. at 147-48, 171 A.3d
1191. The State countered by asserting that the language of the rule only
required disclosure of relevant information regarding a pretrial identification
of Green. Id. at 148, 171 A.3d 1191.
In its analysis of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), the court reviewed precedent.
Green, 456 Md. at 148, 154, 171 A.3d at 1191, 1194. The court had
previously acknowledged that pretrial identification is not limited to photo
arrays, lineups, or other forms of State identification procedures. Id. at 152,
171 A.3d at 1193 (citing Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 178, 771 A.2d
1082, 1092 (2001)). Therefore, even though the identification of Green was
not the result of standard procedures, it inevitably established him as the
shooter. Green, 456 Md. at 163, 171 A.3d at 1200. The court concluded that
the identification of Copeland required disclosure, since it was relevant
information to the identification of Green. Id. at 162, 171 A.3d at 1199.
Applying this conclusion, the court held that under the circumstances of the
present case, the State violated Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) by failing to
disclose Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland. Id. at 156, 171 A.3d at
1196.
After establishing that the State violated Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), the
court examined whether the violation was harmless. Green, 456 Md at 165,
171 A.3d at 1201. In order to determine if the violation was harmless, the
court must assess whether the violation affected the verdict. Id. (citing Hall
v. State, 437 Md. 534, 540-41, 87 A.3d 1287, 1291 (2014)). In applying this
standard, the court held that the State's violation was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because knowledge of the pretrial identification of
Copeland would have assisted Green's counsel in trial preparation. Green,
456 Md. at 166, 171 A.3d at 1202. Thus, the court reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial. Id. at 168, 171 A.3d at 1203. Judge McDonald
dissented, arguing that the majority opinion creates uncertainty in the
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application of the rule and disturbs the precise and unambiguous language of
the rule. Id. at 172, 171 A.3d at 1205.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a pretrial identification of a
co-defendant that is equivalent to an identification of the defendant falls
within the scope of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Therefore, disclosure by the
State is required since that identification is relevant information under the
rule. The court's decision carves a narrow mandatory discovery disclosure
under Md. Rule 4-263, without disturbing the plain meaning of the rule.
This ruling demonstrates the court's goal to preserve fundamental fair trial
rights by balancing the right to put on a defense with the ability of the
prosecution to use relevant evidence in achieving justice. This case requires
the prosecution to exercise its due diligence in reviewing and establishing
whether a pretrial identification of a co-defendant must be disclosed under
Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). This duty could make it challenging for
prosecutors to understand what type of testimony constitutes an identification
requiring disclosure. Expanding this duty of due diligence could also create




IN RE J.J.: IN A CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE
PROCEEDING, TRUTH-COMPETENCY IS NOT A
PREREQUISITE TO THE ADMISSION OF A CHILD'S OUT-
OF-COURT STATEMENT.
By: Kelly Gillett
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Section 11-304
of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code ("Section 11-304"), a child's
hearsay statement concerning abuse was admissible in a Child in Need of
Assistance ("CINA") hearing without a preliminary competency
determination of the child. In re J.J., 456 Md. 428, 456, 174 A.3d 372, 388
(2017). Further, the court held that the lower court properly admitted the
child's statements since it had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. at 456, 174 A.3d at 388.
In August 2015, a nine-year-old female, J.J., told her maternal
grandmother that her father had sexually abused her. Following J.J.'s
allegations, the Department of Social Services removed J.J. from her father's
home and filed a CINA petition. The Department of Social Services filed a
notice of intent to introduce an audio-recording of J.J.'s statements
concerning her father's sexual abuse. The audio recording was the result of
an interview with a licensed clinical social worker. A Section 11-304
hearing was held and J.J.'s statements were admitted after the court found
that all thirteen statutory factors had been established. Subsequently, during
the CINA proceeding, J.J. did not testify, and the court did not conduct an
independent examination of J.J. to determine if her out-of-court statements
had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
After the Section 11-304 hearing, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County
proceeded with the CINA adjudication. During this proceeding the court
held that J.J.'s out-of-court statement was admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted because it possessed the requisite "guarantees of
trustworthiness." The court determined that, in accordance with Section 11-
304(g)(1), the recording of J.J. made an examination of the child's
competency to understand the difference between truth and fabrication
unnecessary. The parents of J.J. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed, holding that a juvenile court is not required to
determine a child's truth competency when determining the admissibility of
an out-of-court statement. The parents subsequently filed a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which was granted.
Three issues were presented to the court of appeals for review. In re JJ,
456 Md. at 446-47, 174 A.3d at 383. First, whether a determination of a
child's competency was required prior to admitting the child's hearsay
statement at a CINA adjudication hearing. Id. at 446, 174 A.3d at 383.
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Second, if an independent examination of J.J. was necessary to establish that
she was competent. Id. at 447, 174 A.3d at 383. Finally, whether J.J.'s
hearsay statements contained the requisite "guarantees of trustworthiness" to
be admissible as required by CP § 11-304. Id. at 446-47, 174 A.3d 382-83.
The court began its analysis by examining the statute itself in addressing
the issue of the J.J.'s competency. In re JJ, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at
384. If the plain meaning of the statue is unclear, the court will look at the
context of the statutory scheme to determine the General Assembly's intent.
In re J.J, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at 384 (2017) (citing Phillips v. State,
451 Md. 180, 196, 152 A.3d 712 (2017); Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551,
165 A.3d 398 (2017). The court of appeals explained that Section 11-304 is
silent on whether the court is required to make a determination of truth-
competency as a prerequisite when ruling on the admissibility of a child's
hearsay statement. In re J.1, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at 384. Therefore,
the court considered the legislative history of the statute. Id.
Upon examining the legislative history of Section 11-304, the court
determined that the General Assembly did not intend for the juvenile court to
determine a child's truth competency. In re JJ., 456 Md. at 449-50, 174
A.3d at 384. The statute had no competency requirement in place when
enacted, and only one bill had been introduced that proposed adding the
requirement. Id. at 450, 174 A.3d at 385. However, the proposed change
was stricken from the bill prior to its enactment. Id. The court concluded
that Section 11-304 was not ambiguous, and that neither the plain language
of the statute, nor the legislative history required a juvenile court to
determine a child's truth competency before admitting that child's hearsay
statement. Id. Consequently, the court determined that it need not address
J.J.'s truth competency. Id. at 452, 174 A.3d at 386.
Additionally, the court found that the foundational requirements of the
statute made a competency determination irrelevant. In re J.J, 456 Md. at
450-51, 174 A.3d at 385. Section 11-304 provides specific conditions that
must be met before a victim child's hearsay statements can be admitted. Id.
at 451, 174 A.3d at 385. The conditions include a finding that an
examination is unnecessary, that there is corroborative evidence, and that the
hearsay statement contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id.
Next, applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, the court examined
the statutory factors regarding the trustworthiness requirement. In re J.J,
456 Md. at 452, 174 A.3d at 386. Finding an examination of J.J.
unnecessary, the court was persuaded by the fact that the lower court played
the audio recording of her hearsay statement, listened to testimony and
arguments, and then evaluated the evidence. Id. at 454, 174 A.3d at 387.
Moreover, the court concluded that the father's statement that he was living
with J.J. provided sufficient corroborative evidence of his opportunity to
commit the abuse. Id. Additionally, J.J.'s in-depth personal knowledge of
the event and sensory detail led the court to determine that the statements had
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the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," satisfying the foundational
requirements of the statute. Id.
The court then turned to the issue raised by J.J.'s parents concerning the
consistent repetition of statements. In re J.J., 456 Md. at 455, 174 A.3d at
387. The parents asserted that J.J.'s statements were not trustworthy because
she did not repeat them consistently. Id. at 455, 174 A.3d at 387-88.
However, the court found no such requirement in Section 11-304. Id.
Ultimately, it held that any inconsistencies in the child's statements went to
the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. Id. Thus, the juvenile
court did not err in concluding that J.J.'s hearsay statement possessed the
"guarantees of trustworthiness," and properly admitted the statements into
evidence. Id. at 455-56, 174 A.3d at 388.
In the instant case, the court of appeals held that the juvenile court did not
err in concluding that J.J.'s out-of-court statement contained the guarantees
of trustworthiness, and thus was admissible. The court held that Section 11-
304 does not require a competency determination prior to admitting a child's
hearsay statements. In addition, the court is refusing to afford parents the
right of confrontation against their child in court. This will make it easier for
counsel to present statements even when the child is available. The decision
affirms the judicial system's intent to protect children from the traumatic
experience of being in a court room, and having to litigate the abuse in the
presence of their alleged abuser. The holding exemplifies the court's




LAMALFA V. HEARN: "DISCLOSURE" UNDER MARYLAND
RULE 5-703(b) MEANS EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMISSIBLE,
UNDER A TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION, SO LONG AS THE
EVIDENCE SATISFIES THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF THE
RULE AND THE EVIDENCE IS USED TO EXPLAIN THE
FACTUAL BASIS OF AN EXPERT'S OPINION.
By: W. Ryan Parry
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that disclosure meant admission
under Maryland Rule 5-703(b), giving the trial court discretion to admit
medical records. Lamalfa v. Hearn, 457 Md. 350, 178 A.3d 501 (2018).
Once admitted, the jury may use the evidence to assess the factual basis of an
expert's opinion. Id. at 356, 178 A.3d at 504. Therefore, the jury may use
the medical records to evaluate the testimony if the data is deemed
trustworthy, unprivileged, reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion, and necessary to illuminate the expert's testimony. Id.
On October 14, 2011, Patricia Lamalfa ("Lamalfa") was riding in the
back seat of an SUV when the vehicle was rear-ended by Janis Heam
("Hearn"). Lamalfa did not immediately seek medical treatment for the
accident until the following morning. She complained of lower back pain
and tenderness in her left forearm, but was released from Mercy Medical
Center ("Mercy"). A week after the accident, Lamalfa sought treatment after
experiencing further pain in her left hip, right shoulder, and tailbone.
In November 2011, Lamalfa underwent an MRI revealing an injury that
would later be diagnosed as a torn rotator cuff requiring surgery. Several
months following the accident, Lamalfa began experiencing abdominal pain
and she was diagnosed with an epigastric hernia, a medical condition she was
previously diagnosed with in 1984. As a result of her injuries, Lamalfa filed
a negligence action against Hearn in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
seeking more than $75,000 in damages.
During trial, both parties called doctors as expert witnesses. Hearn's
expert, Dr. Halikman, stated that he relied upon four of Lamalfa's medical
records in forming his opinion. When Hearn's counsel moved to admit the
medical records, Lamalfa objected, arguing that the medical reports were
hearsay. Ultimately, the court overruled Lamalfa's objection and admitted
all four records into evidence without a limiting instruction. Dr. Halikman
opined that, based upon his review of the medical records, there was a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Lamalfa did not sustain the
rotator cuff injury or the epigastric hernia as a result of the accident.
At the conclusion of trial, the court granted Lamalfa's motion for
judgment, finding Hearn negligent. The case was then sent to the jury for a
determination on the amount of damages. The jury returned a verdict
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awarding Lamalfa the full amount of her medical expenses totaling
$9,926.05 and $650 in non-economic damages.
Lamalfa timely appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
contending that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the four
medical records relied on by Dr. Halikman. The court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, holding that there was no significant difference between
disclosure and admission under Maryland Rule 5-703 ("Md. Rule 5-703").
Therefore, the jurors were permitted to use the medical records, and
Lamalfa's failure to request a limiting instruction was a waiver of the issue
on appeal. Lamalfa proceeded by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to determine whether under
Md. Rule 5-703, disclosed meant admitted and whether the admittance of the
four medical records into evidence was proper.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
plain language of Md. Rule 5-703. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 381, 178 A.3d at
519. Md. Rule 5-703 (a) permits an expert to form an opinion based on data
regardless of whether such data would be admissible into evidence. Id.
Subsection (b) of the rule further states that such data must satisfy four
elements before the trial court may disclose the data to the jury. Id. The
elements require the data to be deemed trustworthy, unprivileged, necessary
to illuminate the expert's testimony, and reasonably relied upon by the
expert. Id. However, the opposing party must request a limiting instruction
that the data only be used in evaluating the validity of the expert's opinion
and not for its substantive value. Id.
While Md. Rule 5-703 does not define the term disclosed, the court
reasoned that if disclosure were to be permitted narrowly, it would have been
specified in the rule. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 382, 178 A.3d at 520. Looking at
precedent, the court reasoned that Maryland courts have consistently
interpreted disclosure to mean admission if the data satisfies the four
elements of the rule. Id. at 382-83, 178 A.3d at 520 (citing Brown v. Daniel
Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 601, 976 A.2d 300, 321 (2009)). These courts
admitted the data into evidence and did not simply disclose them briefly to
the jury, as Lamalfa contended. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 382, 178 A.3d at 520.
The court next addressed Lamalfa's contention that requesting a limiting
instruction was futile once the jury received the medical records. Lamalfa,
457 Md. at 386, 178 A.3d at 522. Md. Rule 5-703 expressly states that upon
request, the trial judge must give a limiting instruction for the jury to use the
data relied upon by the expert in assessing the validity and probative value of
the opinion, and not as substantive evidence. Id. The court further reasoned
that limiting instructions explain to a jury how evidence is to be used, and
that a jury is presumed to follow the instruction. Id. at 387, 178 A.3d at 523.
Therefore, the court determined that since Lamalfa failed to make a motion
for a limiting instruction, she waived any issue as to the weight that the jury
may have given the medical records. Id. at 388, 178 A.3d at 523.
Using this reasoning, the court examined whether the four medical
records relied upon by Hearn's expert witness, Dr. Halikman, satisfied the
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four elements of Md. Rule 5-703. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 388-89, 178 A.3d at
523-24. Md. Rule 5-703 does not require a trial court to announce that the
elements were satisfied on the record. Id. Therefore, the trial court's failure
to mention all the elements did not preclude the conclusion that the elements
for disclosure had been met. Id. The court then acknowledged that Lamalfa
did not dispute that the records were unprivileged or reasonably relied on by
Dr. Halikman. Id. at 391, 178 A.3d at 525. Further they found that the
records were trustworthy since they were created by appropriate medical
professionals. Id. Lastly, due to the time period of the plaintiffs injuries,
the records were found to be necessary to illuminate Dr. Halikman's opinion.
Id. at 392, 178 A.3d at 525-26. Thus, the records satisfied the required
elements of Md. Rule 5-703 (b) and the trial court was correct in admitting
the records. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that disclosed meant admitted
under Md. Rule 5-703 if the evidence satisfies the four elements set forth in
the rule. Therefore, such evidence may, at a trial court's discretion, be
disclosed to the jury to explain the factual basis of an expert's testimony.
This ruling strengthens a party's ability to have the jury view documentation
they otherwise may not be able to access. This holding further emphasizes
the importance of requesting a limiting instruction when challenging a trial
judge's ruling to preserve it for appeal. Furthermore, the court's holding will
require attorneys to take a more calculated approach when determining what
records their expert witnesses will be relying on to form an opinion.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
MOATS V. STATE: A CELL PHONE SEIZED INCIDENT TO
ARREST MAY BE RETAINED IN ORDER FOR POLICE TO
OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT WITHOUT SUSPICION AT
THE TIME OF THE SEIZURE THAT THE PHONE
CONTAINS EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME.
By: Ryan Zabel
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that police may retain a cell
phone seized incident to a lawful arrest for as long as reasonably necessary to
acquire a search warrant. Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 697, 168 A.3d 952,
961 (2017). The police do not need suspicion at the time of the seizure that
the cell phone contains evidence of the crime. Id. The court ruled that
holding a cell phone for three days following the release of the arrestee to
obtain a search warrant for the phone was permissible. Id. Additionally, the
court held that there was probable cause for the judge to issue the warrant.
Id. at 698, 168 A.3d at 961. Therefore, denial of the motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the phone was proper. Id.
In January 2015, Timothy Alan Moats ("Moats") and three other
teenagers were driving in Moats' car. Moats provided marijuana and
suboxone to the other passengers. One of the passengers later alleged that
they were sexually assaulted that evening. Two weeks later, Sergeant
Zimmerman ("Zimmerman") interviewed all passengers, including Moats.
During the interview, Moats admitted to using drugs but denied involvement
in the sexual assault. Based on his admission of distributing drugs, police
obtained an arrest warrant for Moats.
On January 23, 2015, Moats was arrested and transported to Garrett
County jail, where his cell phone was seized. Moats was released from
custody the following day, and the police retained control of his cell phone.
On January 26, 2015, Zimmerman prepared an application and affidavit for a
search warrant of the phone. The affidavit included Moats' admission to
drug distribution and information gained during the other interviews.
Additionally, the affidavit contained Zimmerman's training and experience,
particularly relating to evidence typically found on cell phones during drug
and sexual assault investigations. A judge issued a search warrant, and upon
investigation, sexually explicit photographs and a video of Moats' girlfriend
were discovered on the phone. Moats' girlfriend was 15 years old at the
time the images were taken, and because Moats was 18, he was charged with
possession of child pornography.
Prior to trial, Moats filed a motion to suppress the information obtained
from his cell phone as fruit of an illegal search. Moats' motion was denied,
and he was convicted on one count of possession of child pornography.
Moats appealed the lower court's denial of his motion to suppress. The
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retaining the cell phone in anticipation of the search warrant. Additionally,
the court found the information provided in the affidavit supported a
reasonable inference that evidence of the crime would be discovered on the
phone. The court also held that even if there was no substantial basis for the
issuance of a warrant, Zimmerman acted in good faith in preparing the
affidavit and obtaining the warrant prior to the search. For these reasons, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. Moats, 455 Md. at
693, 168 A.3d at 958. The court was confronted with two issues. The first
issue on appeal was if Moats' suspected involvement in a crime, coupled
with Zimmerman's belief that a cell phone could have been used in that
crime, constituted probable cause to seize and search Moats' cell phone. Id.
The second issue was whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied. Id. However, since the court found the first question to be
sufficient, it did not consider the second issue. Id.
The court began its analysis by examining the retention of the cell phone
while police obtained a search warrant. Moats, 455 Md. at 694, 168 A.3d at
959. Police may automatically seize a cell phone from an arrestee during an
arrest without any suspicion that the cell phone contains evidence of a crime.
Id. at 695, 697, 168 A.3d at 959, 961 (citing Riley v. California, 135 S.Ct.
2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014)). The court determined that the three days it
took to obtain the search warrant was not an unreasonable delay. Moats, 455
Md. at 697, 168 A.3d at 961. The court also noted that Moats' release from
custody did not remove the authority of police to retain the cell phone until
they obtained a search warrant. Id.
The court next addressed the search warrant and search of the cell phone.
Moats, 455 Md. at 698, 168 A.3d at 961. When warrants are reviewed for
probable cause, they must meet the substantial basis standard. Id. This
standard requires a neutral magistrate to find a substantial basis for
concluding that evidence of wrongdoing will be uncovered by the search to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 700, 168 A.3d at 962 (citing Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983)).
The court found that the issuing judge had substantial basis for concluding
there was probable cause to conduct a search of the phone. Moats, 455 Md.
at 704, 168 A.3d at 965. The affidavit contained substantial basis that the
cell phone contained evidence of the drug distribution charges and the sexual
assault allegation. Id. The court noted that the judge has discretion to defer
to the experience and expertise of a police officer in determining if there is a
reasonable inference that evidence will be found in the location specified in
the warrant. Id. at 702, 168 A.3d at 963. The court determined that the
affidavit, which included Moats' confession of drug distribution and
information about the pending sexual assault investigation, gave the judge a
substantial basis to find probable cause that Moats' cell phone would contain
evidence of these crimes. Id. at 702-04, 168 A.3d at 963-65.
1292018]1 Moats v. State
130 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 48.2
Judge Greene and Judge Adkins concurred, based on the concern that
without a temporal requirement search warrants issued for cell phones will
go far beyond the Fourth Amendment. Moats, 455 Md. at 705, 168 A.3d at
965. They argued that the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment prevents cell phone warrants from giving uninhibited access.
Id. Thus, the majority's decision constituted an unnecessary invasion of
privacy by permitting an overly broad search. Id.
In Moats the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that police may seize and
retain an arrestee's cell phone for as long as reasonably necessary to seek a
search warrant. This holding clarifies precedent regarding cell phones
automatically being seized upon a lawful arrest and allows the cell phone to
be retained even beyond the release of the arrestee. Additionally, it shows
the deference given to police officers when there is a question about probable
cause in a search warrant. This high level of deference could open the door
to warrants allowing uninhibited searches of a cell phones, potentially
infringing on privacy rights of individuals.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
PORTER V. STATE: A SPOUSE SUFFERING FROM
BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME DOES NOT HAVE TO
EXPERIENCE ABUSE WITHIN MINUTES OF HIS OR HER
DEFENSIVE ACTION TO BE ENTITLED TO AN IMPERFECT
SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION; A CLAIM OF
IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE IS NOT FORFEITED WHEN
THE SPOUSE CONTRACTS A THIRD PARTY TO TAKE
DEFENSIVE ACTION.
By: Tyler Marie Duckett
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Maryland's
battered spouse syndrome statute, a defendant who kills in a non-
confrontational setting is entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-
defense. Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 247-49, 166 A.3d 1044, 1060-61
(2017). This instruction does not require a spouse suffering from battered
spouse syndrome to have experienced abuse within minutes or hours of his
or her defensive action. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061. The court further held
that a battered spouse who contracts a third party does not forfeit a claim to
an imperfect self-defense instruction. Id. at 251, 166 A.3d at 1061-62.
In early 2010 in Baltimore County, Karla Louise Porter ("Porter")
contracted with Walter Bishop ("Bishop") to kill her husband Ray Porter
("Ray") in exchange for $400. Ray was shot and killed by Bishop after
Porter sent him to fix the alarm at their gas station. A week later Porter was
charged with first degree murder, three counts of solicitation to commit first
degree murder, and other related crimes.
During the trial, Porter testified to several instances of verbal and physical
abuse over the course of their relationship, including being beaten with
various objects. Additionally, Porter stated that in the year preceding Ray's
death, she was terrified on a daily basis. Porter also presented witnesses
corroborating her claims of abuse and called two experts to establish that she
suffered from battered spouse syndrome. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court read the State's proposed jury instruction on imperfect self-defense.
Those instructions required that Porter had used no more force than
reasonably necessary to defend herself, that retreat from Ray had been
unsafe, and that she had not been the aggressor. The jury subsequently found
Porter guilty on all counts.
Porter filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the jury was
inadequately instructed on how to evaluate evidence of battered spouse
syndrome in the context of imperfect self-defense. The motion was denied,
and Porter appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed,
holding that Porter had not presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to an
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imperfect self-defense jury instruction. Therefore, any error in delivering the
instruction was harmless.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. Porter, 455 Md. at
233, 166 A.3d at 1052. The court was asked to analyze the relationship
between the elements of imperfect self-defense and the battered spouse
syndrome statute. Id. at 234, 166 A.3d at 1052. Specifically, the court
focused on whether Porter was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect
self-defense and if the trial court's erroneous jury instruction was harmless.
Id. at 239-40, 166 A.3d at 1055-56.
The court began by assessing the legal structure of self-defense in
Maryland. Porter, 455 Md. at 234-35, 166 A.3d at 1053. While perfect self-
defense requires the defendant to have had a reasonable belief that they were
in imminent danger, imperfect self-defense only requires an actual,
subjective belief that they were in danger. Id. at 235, 166 A.3d at 1053. The
defendant must produce some evidence on the issue of mitigation or self-
defense. Id. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056 (citing Wilson v. State, 422 Md. 533,
541, 30 A.3d 955 (2011)). Once the evidence has been presented, a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction explaining the elements of perfect
or imperfect self-defense. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.
In order to determine whether Porter was entitled to an instruction on
imperfect self-defense under the doctrine, the court analyzed the meaning of
imminent or immediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.
Specifically, the court reviewed the rationale for limiting self-defense to
threats of imminent or immediate danger. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.
Self-defense is often limited to only these threats because a non-imminent
threat may never come to fruition and because there are other ways to
address a non-imminent threat besides responding with defensive force. Id. at
248, 166 A.3d at 1061 (citing Kit Kinports, The Myth of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 24 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 313, 315 (2015)). However,
experts testified that in a cyclical, abusive relationship, the threatened
violence will eventually come to fruition, but the syndrome prevents the
battered spouse from pursuing other options. Porter, 455 Md. at 247, 166
A.3d at 1060. Therefore, the court found these rationales were not
undermined by a claim of self-defense when a battered spouse kills in a non-
confrontational situation. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.
The court next addressed the distinction between imminent and
immediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 241, 166 A.3d at 1056. Porter argued that the
imminent or immediate requirement was satisfied because she presented
evidence that the threat of violence was always present. Id. The court found
that the elements of imperfect self-defense required Porter to show that she
actually feared either imminent danger or immediate danger and that it was
unnecessary to prove both. Id. at 245, 166 A.3d at 1059. Further, the court
noted that an imminent threat is not dependent on its proximity to the
defensive act. Id. Rather, an imminent threat is one that places the
defendant in immediate fear for their life. Id. This distinction aligns with
the General Assembly's intent behind the battered spouse syndrome statute,
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which allows testimony explaining how a spouse might fear imminent
danger during a break between violent episodes. Id. at 245-46, 166 A.3d at
1059. Therefore, since Porter feared imminent danger, she was entitled to an
instruction on imperfect self-defense. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061.
Next, the court addressed whether a person who contracts a third party to
kill their abuser forfeits their right to an imperfect self-defense instruction.
Porter, 455 Md. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. The court noted that imperfect
self-defense negates the element of malice, but not premeditation. Id. A
spouse claiming imperfect self-defense must show that he or she feared
imminent or immediate danger; they do not have to prove that they acted
spontaneously. Id. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. Thus, the means by which a
spouse takes defensive action against an abuser does not impact whether he
or she actually believed that they were in imminent danger at the time of the
killing. Id. Therefore, Porter contracting a third party did not forfeit an
imperfect self-defense instruction. Id.
Ultimately, the court held that Porter had met her burden of establishing
that she was entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction. Porter, 455
Md. at 252-53, 166 A.3d at 1063. Further, Porter demonstrated that the jury
had considered the self-defense claim since it requested more information
relating to battered spouse syndrome during deliberation. Id. Therefore, the
erroneous instruction was not harmless. Id. at 253, 166 A.3d at 1063-64.
The court thus vacated all of Porter's convictions and remanded the case. Id.
at 255, 166 A.3d at 1065.
The dissenting opinion alleged that the majority's definition of imminent
or immediate was too broad. Porter, 455 Md. at 259, 166 A.3d at 1067. The
dissenting judges argued that the majority's holding allows evidence
regarding battered spouse syndrome to be used unlimitedly. Id. They were
concerned with how broadly this interpretation can be applied. Id. Further,
they opposed the majority's holding on contract killings, alleging that under
stare decisis it erroneously contradicts jurisprudence, which typically bars
self-defense jury instructions in such cases. Id. at 263, 166 A.3d at 1069.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that a battered spouse is
entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, if he or she presents
some evidence that they feared imminent or immediate harm at the time of
the killing. Additionally, the court held that a battered spouse does not forfeit
this right if they contract a third party. This holding signals a progressive
shift in domestic violence jurisprudence, by allowing a jury to consider
evidence explaining a battered spouse's thoughts and decisions in taking
action against his or her abuser. This will ensure that battered spouses are
afforded fair trials by allowing juries to be presented with relevant evidence
when considering the elements of self-defense in this context.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
STATE V. COPES: THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIED
TO EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY DETECTIVES USING A CELL
SITE SIMULATOR BECAUSE IT WAS REASONABLE FOR
THEM TO RELY ON A COURT ORDER ISSUED UNDER
MARYLAND'S PEN REGISTER STATUTE.
By: Hayley C. Lucas
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it was objectively reasonable
for detectives to believe that their use of a cell site simulator was permissible
under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Copes, 454 Md. 581, 630, 165 A.3d
418, 447 (2017). Further, the court determined that the application for the
order, filed under the Maryland Pen Register Statute, appropriately provided
probable cause and satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 625, 165 A.3d at 444. As a result, the court held that the
detectives had acted in good faith and, therefore, the evidence obtained from
the use of the cell site simulator should not have been suppressed. Id. at 630,
165 A.3d at 447.
On February 4, 2014, the burned body of Ina Jenkins ("Jenkins") was
found in the rear lot of a vacant home in northwest Baltimore. Detective
Bryan Kershaw ("Detective Kershaw") from the Baltimore City Police
Department was assigned as the lead homicide investigator. During his
investigation, Detective Kershaw determined that a missing cell phone
associated with Jenkins was still in active use.
On February 11, 2014, detectives submitted a sworn application under the
Maryland Pen Register Statute seeking court authorization to use a cellular
tracking device to locate Jenkins' cell phone. At the time of the
investigation, no Maryland statutes specifically addressed law enforcement's
use of cellular tracking devices. As a result, it was common practice among
law enforcement agencies to modify pen register applications when seeking
judicial authorization to use cellular tracking devices. The application in the
instant case included a summary of why detectives believed the phone had
been taken by the person responsible for Jenkins' homicide. The circuit
court issued the order finding probable cause and that detectives had
established the missing cell phone as relevant to the ongoing criminal
investigation.
On February 18, 2014, pursuant to the court order, the detectives
employed a cell site simulator to track the missing cell phone's location. The
device ultimately led detectives to the apartment of Robert L. Copes
("Copes"). Inside the apartment detectives found Copes, the missing cell
phone, and evidence linking Copes to Jenkins' murder. Copes was indicted
and charged with first-degree murder.
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Subsequently, Copes filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered
from his apartment. Copes argued that the use of the cell site simulator was
a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment, and that all evidence
obtained using the simulator was the fruit of an illegal search. The Circuit
Court for Baltimore City granted Copes' motion to suppress. The circuit
court held that the use of the cell site simulator without a warrant was an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, which the State
appealed.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's
decision. The court concluded that detectives failed to describe the
technology to be used with particularity and, therefore, the good faith
exception did not apply. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The issue before the Court of Appeals of Maryland was whether the
evidence recovered by detectives through the use of the cell site simulator
was properly excluded. The State argued that even if using the simulator
was a search, the court order obtained by the detectives was equivalent to a
warrant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The court began its analysis
by examining case law involving law enforcement's use of cell site
simulators pursuant to court orders under pen register statutes. Copes, 454
Md. at 622-23, 165 A.3d at 442-43. The court determined that where the
application provides particular facts supporting a finding of probable cause,
the order may function as a warrant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 623, 165 A.3d at 442-43 (citing Wisconsin v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798,
801 (Wis. 2014)).
The application submitted by the detectives in this case satisfied both the
probable cause and particularity requirements for a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment. Copes, 454 Md. at 625, 165 A.3d at 444. The sworn
application provided probable cause since the detectives had identified the
particular phone to be tracked, described how the phone was linked to
Jenkins, and detailed the basis for the detectives' belief that the phone would
be relevant to the investigation. Id. at 625, 165 A.3d at 444. Furthermore,
the application described the t chnology to be used to locate the cell phone.
Id. at 629, 165 A.3d at 446. Ultimately, however, the court declined to make
any determination on the constitutionality of the order, but recognized the
strength of the issue in its analysis of whether the good faith exception
applied. Id. at 625-26, 165 A.3d at 444.
In applying the good faith exception, the court noted that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful conduct by law enforcement
officials. Id. at 607, 165 A.3d at 433. As a result, the exclusionary rule is
not applicable when law enforcement officials engage in objectively
reasonable activity, even if the activity is later determined to be in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 604, 165 A.3d at 432 (citing United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)). Thus, the court concluded that it was
objectively reasonable for detectives to believe that the court order provided
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constitutionally-sufficient authorization for use of the cell site simulator.
Copes, 454 Md. at 625, 165 A.3d at 444.
The court reasoned that although the application failed to describe the
details about the technology to be used, the details provided were sufficient
to satisfy the particularity requirement. Copes, 454 Md. at 628-29, 165 A.3d
at 445-46. In rejecting the intermediate court's denial of the good faith
exception, the court found that a fair reading of the order encompassed the
use of cell site simulator. Id. at 629, 165 A.3d at 446. Furthermore, because
detectives had previously relied on applications for similar orders, the court
found it was reasonable for detectives to believe the order provided sufficient
authorization for their use of the simulator. Id. at 626, 165 A.3d at 444.
Therefore, the court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied. Id. at 630, 165 A.3d at 447.
The dissent argued that the application and order based on Maryland's
Pen Register Statute was insufficient, and did not satisfy the constitutional
requirements for a warrant. Copes, 454 Md. at 630, 165 A.3d at 447. The
dissent specifically argued that the application did not describe the place to
be searched or the invasive technology to be used. Id. at 639-40, 165 A.3d at
452-53. The dissent concluded that because the application failed to satisfy
the particularity requirement for a warrant, the good faith exception did not
apply. Id. at 639, 165 A.3d at 452 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 923 (1984)).
In Copes, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the good faith
exception applied to any violation of Copes' Fourth Amendment rights. This
decision highlights the difficulties courts face when trying to interpret how
existing laws should apply to evolving technologies. In order to safeguard
the privacy interests of individuals, the courts should hold law enforcement
officials to higher standards when using new technology that may infringe on
citizens' privacy rights. This could encourage law enforcement officials to
take enhanced precautions when dealing with new technology in order to
avoid the suppression of evidence.
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